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Nordic firms undertake acquisitions and mergers with a growing pace, reaching M&A 
activity levels comparable to US and continental Europe. However, earlier research on 
acquirer returns does not cover North European deals.  
 
In this paper an overview of the Nordic takeover market is provided.  Initial sample of 
3,061 domestic and cross-border corporate takeovers taken place in years 2005 -2015 is 
analyzed to find the main characteristic of Nordic M&A market. Further, a sample of 
203 deals is statistically analyzed to see if the phenomenon linked to US and Continent 
European M&A deals also stretch out to the North European financial market.  
 
The purpose of the study is to shed light on how acquirer’s choice of payment method 
(all-cash, all-equity, or mixed deals) and the legal status of the target (public or private) 
affect the acquirer’s performance. This performance is measured with short term acquir-
er returns. 
 
An event study is executed to measure the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) follow-
ing the merger announcement. Three different methods are used to carry out the event 
study to capture the true presence or absence of abnormal returns caused by the takeover 
transaction. These three methods are the market model, the mean adjusted return meth-
od and the market adjusted return method.  
 
This study provides empirical evidence that M&A deals, on average, are a positive net 
present investment for the North European acquirers. Moreover, the target selection and 
the payment method of the deal are found to have statistically significant impact on ac-
















1.1. Background and motivation 
 
Takeovers are considered to be one of the most important areas of corporate finance, for 
both the economy and for the firms. In 2016 over 47.000 mergers transactions took 
place worldwide with a total value of more than 3.5 trillion US dollars. For firms, the 
mergers and acquisitions are the most forceful way to gain a competitive advantage, 
create efficiency gains, and enhance growth. (Anderade, Mitchell and Stafford 2001: 
103 - 105; Mulherin and Boone 2000; IMAA 2017). 
 
Large part of the empirical research in the area of mergers and acquisitions (M&A´s) 
focuses on the announcement returns of both the bidder and the target. When the net 
wealth effects of these corporate combinations are studied, various studies have demon-
strated that mergers, in general, create value to the combined entity. In other words 
M&A transactions are considered to have a positive net present values as an investment. 
These findings are in line with theories based on efficiency and synergy gains. (Jensen 
and Ruback 1983; Anderade et al 2001; Mulherin and Boone 2000). 
 
However, most previous findings show that these positive gains linked to M&A deals 
go to the pockets of the target’s shareholders. Whereas evidence suggest that acquirers 
are barely breaking even in these transactions.  However, the evidence on the unfavour-
able wealth effects reported for the acquirers is often found to be insignificant, but in 
some cases even statistically significant losses to the acquirer are found. There are im-
plications in previous studies that more positive stock market reactions can be accom-
plished with acquisition of private targets. The explanation for this phenomenon varies 
widely. (Capron & Shen 2007; Koherns 2004: 1151; Jensen and Ruback 1983).  
 
As a phenomenon the acquisition process of privately held firms has not gained a lot of 
attention in the field of M&A research. In this thesis, the acquirer’s choice between pub-
lic and private targets is examined. The aim of this paper is to solve if there is an appar-
ent difference in acquirer performance between transactions where the target is private 
firm compared to ones where the target´s stock is publicly traded. Secondly, the impact 





method of the deal refers to the financing decision made by the deal participants. Tradi-
tionally the deal can be financed with the bidding firm’s stock, cash or with a combina-
tion of these two. Finally, if some takeover deals are found to generate more positive (or 
negative) stock market reactions for the acquirer than others, the intention is to recog-
nize the factors most relevant to bidder returns.  (Capron & Shen 2007).  
 
Evidence on acquirer returns is highly mixed and not too many studies on these returns 
come to the same conclusion. Still, various previous findings imply that acquisition of 
public targets (i.e. public-to-public deals) financed with cash generate insignificant ac-
quirer returns and significantly negative returns for stock offers. Findings on acquirer 
returns on private target acquisitions (i.e. public-to-private) deals are even more mixed, 
but it can be noted that findings between these two types of deals are not in line with 
each other. (Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller 2002).  
 
Moreover, previous findings indicate that acquirers of private targets experience abnor-
mal and positive returns regardless of the payment method. In addition, several studies 
show that the gains are even more positive when private target deals are financed with 
common stock instead of cash, and this difference is often found to be significant. 
(Chang 1998; Fuller et al.  2002; Koherns and Ang 2000).  
 
One valid explanation for the superior performance of private target acquirers is the 
nature of information. The limited information available on private firms can provide 
value creation opportunities when the private information is accurately exploited. On 
the other hand, the restricted information available on private targets can limit the ac-
quirer’s search of these targets. In addition, acquiring private targets instead of public 
ones increases the risk of miss valuation. Valuing privately held companies is often a 
complex process as a private firm never has an observable market price. Whereas the 
existence of corporate control for public firms provides the information-processing tools 
and a base for asset valuation which are available for all potential bidders. (Anderade et 
al. 2001). 
 
In this study we focus on the wealth effect of the buy side (i.e. the acquirer), since the 
target loses its existence after the deal is closed and becomes a part of the combined 
entity. Due to data limitations we only consider deals where the acquirer is a public 
firm.  Further we classify the deals in to two subsamples according to the ownership 
structure of the target.  These two subsamples are public-to-public deals, this and pub-





counterparties are listed firms and the second to deals where the target is an unlisted 
firm.   
 
1.2. Purpose of the study 
 
Purpose of this study is to estimate the factors that are most significant when consider-
ing abnormal acquirer returns in the Nordic takeover market. Abnormal returns (AR) 
are the actual returns minus the expected (normal) returns of a security. The sum of all 
abnormal returns (CAR) is calculated over the event window to capture the whole pres-
ence of the event. If more positive abnormal returns are found on takeovers where the  
targets is private the main interest is to find why unlisted firms are sold at a discount 
compared to  those firms which equity is publicly traded. Vice versa if acquirers of pub-
lic targets perform better the aim is to solve why. If there appears to be a discount in the 
M&A market concerning private targets the possible discount could be explained with 
factors such as differences in merger motivation, the relative size of the target to the 
acquirer, industry of the firms, factors related to liquidity of the assets, and information 
asymmetry. On the other hand, if the findings show that the performance of acquirers 
buying publicly traded targets is superior this could be explained with better transparen-
cy of value in public firms. (Ninon 2004: 1151). 
 
In this paper when M&A success is discussed it refers to the fact that the deal is benefi-
cial in the eyes of the acquirer; target is not overvalued and deal is done under the as-
sumption that acquirer’s main purpose is to maximise its shareholders value in the long 
run.  The purpose is to shed light to merger transactions placed in North Europe and to 
find the deal characteristics that are most significant to acquirer performance in takeover 
transactions taking place in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, or Sweden. Both do-
mestic and cross boarder deals from this region are taken into consideration.  
 
The primary topic of the study is the ownership structure of the target and whether the 
acquisitions of private targets are able to create more positive stock market reactions 
compared to acquisition of public targets? Secondly, the impact of financing decision to 
acquirer performance is measured. The aim is to find out if there is a difference in ac-
quirer performance between deals financed with cash, common stock or with a mix of 
these two. Reflecting to previous findings, the ownership structure of the target and the 
difference in wealth effect of the different payment methods are assumed to be linked. 
This will be tested with a data set covering 203 Nordic takeovers from which 51 are 






1.3. Intended contribution 
 
As previous studies from US such as Chang (1998), Ang and Kohers (2001) and Fuller 
et al. (2002), and studies from UK such as Conn et al. (2005) Draper and Paudyal 
(2006) and Faccio et al. (2006) for 17 European countries show that acquirers of unlist-
ed targets generate more positive gains around the announcement period compared to 
acquisitions of publicly traded targets. And these gains are highly linked to the method 
of payment of the deals. These previous studies only cover US, UK and the continental 
European countries leaving the M&A market of Nordic Europe unexplored. Moreover, 
most of the previous findings (see, for instance Ang and Koherns 2001, Chang 1998, 
Fuller et. al 2002) indicate opposite effects between public-to-public and public-to-
private deals when it comes to acquirer returns and method of payment. Where in public 
deals cash seem to be more favorable option, in private target acquisitions stock fi-
nanced deals seem to generate more positive stock price reactions for the acquirer.  
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. In this study we go on 
to test if these findings on announcement returns hold within a sample of Nordic firms, 
which often differ from US, UK and central Europe in many areas. An empirical re-
search is carried out to measure the short-term wealth effect from a sample of Nordic 
M&A deals. An event study is executed to solve if M&A deals overall create value for 
the firms and the economy and if there is a correlation to be found between certain deal 
characteristics and acquirer performance. The aim is to evaluate bidder returns follow-
ing the event and the factors that are most significant in the light of abnormal bidder 
returns in the Nordic takeover market.  
 
Initial sample of thousands of merger announcements taken place in Northern Europe 
between years 2005-2015 was reviewed in order to find a sample of 203 deals meeting 
the criteria in which an objective statistical research on acquirer performance can be 
carried out. In the full information setting, it is assumed that change in acquirer’s stock 
price reflects an accurate and unbiased estimation of the value created by the deal. (Ek-
kayokkaya, Holmes and Paudyal 2009: 1201). 
 
The main intention is to solve whether there is an existing link between the target selec-
tion and the financing decision of the transaction and does this possible correlation act 
the same way as in other financial markets. Also, additional factors such as geographic 






1.4. Structure of the paper 
 
The second chapter of this paper provides an overview of the previous studies focusing 
on takeover transactions. This is followed by a deeper literature review on abnormal 
acquirer returns in Chapter3. Also the possible sources for abnormal returns are present-
ed this section. These sources are characteristic differences between unlisted and listed 
firms, including topics such as liquidity, ownership structure, and information dispari-
ties. Furthermore, methods of financing M&A and its impact to acquirer returns are 
evaluated. In addition, the impact of the geographic distance between the target and the 
acquirer will be discussed.   
 
In Chapter 4. the motives of doing acquisitions and mergers are discussed. Furthermore, 
the impact of M&A to the economy and the financial markets are examined. Also the 
existence of M&A waves and the drivers of M&A waves are presented.  Chapter 5. start 
the empirical section of this study with a presentation of the research data. The method 
used to execute the empirical study of this paper is introduced in Chapter 6. Section six 
also explains the approach and models in use. Finally we present findings in Chapter 7. 






2. LITERATURE REWIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
2.1. Previous studies 
 
The evidence on whether mergers and acquisitions create value for shareholders are 
based on stock market reactions of merger announcements. The most traditional and 
statistically reliable way is to do an event study, where the creation or destruction of 
value is measured with existence of abnormal returns during the event window.  (An-
drade et al. 2001). 
 
Nearly all research on mergers and acquisitions has focused on takeovers of publicly 
traded targets. Chang´s (1998) study is a one exception as he studies the effect of meth-
od of payment choice with a data set of 281 privately held target takeovers. Chang´s 
results indicate that private target acquirers making stock offers gain positive abnormal 
returns while in cash offers no significant abnormal returns for the acquirer can be 
found. These findings are different compared to the evidence found on deals where the 
target is public. Notably, majority of studies measuring wealth effects of M&A´s in-
volving two public deal counterparts report either close to zero or slightly positive ac-
quirer returns in cash mergers and negative return for the acquirers using stock as a 
method of payment. (Chang 1998; Koherns 2004:1151).  
 
Chang (1998) presents three testable hypotheses to find the core of bidder returns when 
the target is privately held. Firstly, he notes that when the takeover market is competi-
tive the acquisitions itself should be zero net present value investment. Whereas the 
competition for unlisted targets is limited the possibility of underpayment increases and 
it is possible that the bidding firm will experience abnormal returns. Chang names this 
phenomenon as The Limited Competition Hypothesis. (Chang 1998: 774).  
 
Second factor is The Monitoring Hypothesis, which concentrates on the creation of out-
side block holders. As privately held target´s ownership structure is often concentrated, 
this group of shareholders can serve as an effective monitoring tool of managerial per-
formance after the closure of the deal, which could have a positive effect on the firm 
value. On the other hand there are opposite views on the effects of concentrated owner-





space for managerial entrenchment, which can make takeovers more costly and decrease 
the value of the takeover. (Chang 1998: 774, Fama and Jensen 1983).  
The third testable hypothesis by Chang (1998) that is earlier introduced in a study of 
Myers and Majluf (1984) is the The Information Hypothesis. When firm with a large 
number of shareholders is acquired with common stock it may cause problems with 
asymmetric information. When managers of the acquiring firm offer their stock as a 
payment of the deal it may reduce the value of their stock because the market may as-
sume that the managers possess superior information of true value of their firm and are 
willing to sell their stock because they believe it is overvalued. From the targets’ per-
spective it is essential to evaluate the bidding firm´s prospect with a care as they will 
become owners of the merged firm after the deal is closed. When the owners of the tar-
get are willing to accept large block of shares from the acquirer it indicates that they 
value the stock high. This signals positive information about the bidding firm and may 
cause a positive stock price reaction. (Myers and Majluf 1984).  
 
Ekkayokkaya, Holmes and Paudyal (2009) agree that the acquisition discount of unlist-
ed targets can be partly explained by information asymmetry. Thus, in their study based 
in UK the authors suggest that unlisted target acquirer’s short-term gains may be an 
outcome of investors` excessive optimism originating from limited and biased infor-
mation. Therefore, it presents a question if abnormal acquirer returns linked to private 
targets are sustainable in the long run. (Ekkayokkaya et al. 2009: 1201).  
 
The results of Capron and Shen (2007) indicate that acquirers prefer private targets 
when the industry is familiar to them and are more likely to favour public targets when 
entering a new field of business. According to the results of their event study and survey 
data it is shown that in merger announcements the acquirers of private targets perform 
better than acquirers of public targets when the endogeneity bias has been controlled.  
Capron´s and Shen´s main finding is that acquirers of public firm performed better 
when they acquired a private firm. Also, vice versa acquires of private firm performed 
better acquiring a private firm than they would have acquiring a public one. Their find-
ings indicate that there are various other factors than target´s ownership structure that 
have an impact on acquirer returns, such as industry and the relative size of the deal 
counterparties. Their findings are done under the expectation that acquirer returns aris-
ing from a target choice are not universal but are linked to the type of research done by 






A study by Cooney, Moeller and Stegemoller (2008) investigates the under-pricing of 
private targets by focusing to the valuation process involved. The research examines the 
acquisitions of privately held firms. It finds a positive relationship between target valua-
tion revision and acquirer announcement returns. The study also shows that returns from 
acquirer announcements are on average positive. Thus, the positive returns mainly con-
sist from targets that were acquired for less than they were prior valuated. According to 
Cooney et al. (2008) these pricing effects arise from uncertainty of target valuation and 
behavioural biases in negotiation outcomes. Also Capron and Shen (2007) give atten-
tion to information asymmetries. The acquirer´s fear of overpayment caused by adverse 
selection problem is diminished with lowered bidding price (Cooney, Moeller & 
Stegemoller 2008: 51-66; Capron and Shen 2007).  
 
On the opposite view, findings from a study by Maksimovic et al. (2013) indicates more 
efficient corporate governance for public firms. They claim that public firms make su-
perior acquisition decisions compared to private firms measured by efficiency gains. 
This seems to hold even though conflict of separation of ownership and control causes 
more stress in public firms than in privately owned and often concentrated firms. These 
findings indicate that an easy access to capital for productive firms may be more valua-
ble than the possible value lost from the separation of ownership and control. (Maksi-
movic, Phillips and Yang. 2013: 2216). 
 
Grinblatt and Titman (2002: 708) argue that the stock returns around the merger an-
nouncement does not fully reflect the profitability of the acquisition and state that, “the 
stock returns of the bidder at the time of the announcement of the bid may tell us more 
about how the market is reassessing the bidder’s business than it does about the value of 
the acquisition.”  Moreover, Hietala, Kaplan and Robinsson (2001) state that the takeo-
ver announcement provides information about the synergies as a whole.  Takeover pro-
vides market information about the target´s and the bidder´s standalone values; hence it 
also provides information about the possible bidder overpayment. They note that it is 
not possible to isolate these effects from one another. In other words it is impossible to 
recognize the actual cause for market reaction following the merger announcement. 
(Grinblatt and Titman 2002: 708; Hietala, Kaplan and Robinsson 2000). 
 
Also Koeplin, Sarin and Shapiro (2000) focus on the acquisition process of unlisted 
firms and underline the valuation differences between public and privately held targets. 
They value domestic takeovers and find that, based on earnings multiples of the targets, 





these findings are based on earnings multiples of the targets. Thus, when sales multiples 
are used as measurement, i.e. how much is paid for the target relative to its sales there 
does not seem to be a significant difference between the two target groups. Koeplin et 
al. argue that the private company discount is caused by lack of marketability, in other 
words the difficulty of selling restricted (unlisted) stock. This phenomenon is also 
known as the liquidity discount. (Koeplin, et al. 2000; Koherns 2004; 1151).  
 
Various studies have been conducted about the liquidity discount. Also variety of meth-
odologies has been used to estimate the level of liquidity discounts. The most common-
ly used method involves pricing of the restricted stock. In addition, there are studies that 
include prior Initial public offerings (IPOs), the cost of IPOs, option pricing models and 
the value of subsidiaries of parent firms to their evaluation of liquidity dis-
count.(DePamphilis 2012: 384).  
 
Faccio et al. (2006) argue that the liquidity effect do not alone explain the superior per-
formance that is associated to acquiring private targets. Likewise to Capron and Shen 
(2007) Faccio´s study concludes that the bargaining power between the target and the 
acquirer has a significant role when separating private and public firm acquisitions. Ac-
cording to Capron at al. (2007) the role of information in the target selection process 
and its impact to value creation in M&A´s has been widely neglected in earlier studies. 
(Faccio et al. 2006; Capron et al. 2007).   
 
Abnormal acquirer returns are measured with stock price movement around the an-
nouncement date of the corporate event. Hietala et al. (2002) state that there is three 
different parts of information that may cause fluctuation to acquirer´s share price when 
the merger is announced. Firstly, the announcement provides information about the syn-
ergies between the deal counterparties. The second factor is the stand-alone value of the 
transaction. The last factor influencing the share price reactions is how this value is di-
vided between the acquirer and the target. (Hietala et al. 2002: 1 – 2).  
 
We have to recognize that these three factors and the contribution these factors have on 
acquirer’s share price movement are impossible to separate from one another in a con-
text of a particular takeover. For example if favourable (or unfavourable) information 
about the acquirer or the target is revealed at the announcement, it is not possible to tell 
if the change in market price of the stock will exceed (or not exceed) the synergies that 
are accomplished with the deal. Whereas if favourable (unfavourable) information is 





vealed information has on bidder´s stock price overstates (or understates) the benefits of 
the transaction to the bidder. (Hietala et al. 2002: 2, Jensen & Ruback 1983). 
 
Early findings of Jensen and Ruback (1983) indicate that in general positive gains are 
generated from M&A transactions for the target firm´s shareholders and the sharehold-
ers of the bidder firm at least do not suffer losses. Their results show that the abnormal 
stock price movements corresponding with successful corporate takeovers for targets 
are around 30 percentages and 4 percentile for bidder in case of tender offers. In mer-
gers the statistically significant abnormal stock price change is 20 percentile for the tar-
get and on average zero for the bidder. The stock price movements are adjusted for 
market wide price changes, i.e. the abnormal acquirer returns are market adjusted. (Jen-
sen & Ruback 1983: 5 – 8). 
 
 
In their US originated study Anderade et al. (2001) evaluate abnormal returns around 
the announcement period with point of view on both the bidder and the target. They find 
that on average the combined abnormal returns are fairly similar over decades – with 3, 
688 completed mergers over the years from 1973 to a year 1998 the average abnormal 
acquirer return vary from 1,4 percent to 2,6 percent, with an overall average of 1,8. The 
presented results are abnormal returns calculated over a three day event window. When 
the authors expand the event window to twenty days prior the announcement to the end 
of the closing date of the merger, the results are almost identical. Combined wealth ef-
fect of the acquirer and the target during the announcement period sets to 1.9 percent. 
However when the event window is expanded to 142 days the result cannot be statisti-
cally distinguished from zero. The results presented are based on a data set where all the 
bidders and all the targets are publicly traded, i.e. have a viewable market price. (An-
derade et al. 2001: 110).  
 
Most studies covering public-to-public deals seem to agree that the stakeholders of the 
target firm are the clear winners of the takeover transactions. Where on average mergers 
do not destroy the value of its participant – are the abnormal returns for the acquirer´s 
shareholders negative. Thus this is not clear at a conventional level because these nega-
tive estimates are often statistically insignificant, so the result cannot be viewed as reli-
able. Still, it is clear that performance of the target is significantly more positive. (An-






Andrade et al. (2001) report that on average abnormal returns to the target firm´s share-
holders are astonishing 16 percent in the announcement period. With a longer event 
window this figure raises to 24 percent. Both of these positive gains are found to be 
significant at a significance level of 0.1.  Andrade et al. (2001) also make a notion that 
the corresponding abnormal return for the acquirer firms is around two percentile on a 
three day event window. This leads to circumstances where the shareholders of the pub-
licly traded target are able to realize a profit over a tree day time period that they would 
on average level expect to gain over an 16-month period. (Anderade et al. 2001: 110-
111.)  
 
What makes these abnormal target returns interesting is that these figures seem to be 
remarkably stable over time. Even though mergers cluster (this is discussed further 
when evaluating M&A activity) there does not seem to be a significant variance in tar-
get returns, vice versa the abnormal returns are consistently over decades found to be on 
an average level of 16 percent around the announcement period. (Jensen & Ruback 
1983; Anderade et al 2001: 111.)  
 
As a result of data limitation, this study only estimates the short-term wealth effect for 
acquiring company’s shareholders. In comparison to the empirical findings covering the 
wealth effects of the target side, the findings about abnormal returns for acquiring firms 
are more unpredictable, which makes acquirer returns more interesting topic to investi-
gate. The prior literature reports both positive and negative reaction in acquirer stock 
price following the merger announcement.   
 
Previous studies also suggest that corporate control is a factor of successful corporate 
takeover. Definitions of corporate control vary widely. It can be determined as the man-
agement of corporate recourses (Jensen and Ruback 1983) referring to the given right to 
fire and hire employees and to the right to set the level of compensation for top-level 
managers (Fama & Jensen 1983).  
 
When a firm is acquired the control rights are transferred from the target firm to the 
board of directors of the acquiring firm. Although top-level control rights are owned by 
the board the right to manage corporate resources is often delegated to internal manag-
ers. This allows the acquiring firm to gain the right to manage the human resources of 
the target firm less painfully after the takeover. Also the price of acquiring corporate 
control is a topic of M&A research. Jensen and Ruback (1983) find that the sharehold-





get, i.e. the profitability of the takeover is reduced. The research on corporate control 
effect on acquirer returns is limited. (Jensen & Ruback 1983: 6) 
 
Firms relative sizes, geographic location, asymmetric information, choice of payment, 
and ownership structure have all been found to have an impact on the success of takeo-
ver transactions. That to said, it has to underline that these factors are not independent 
from one another. For example, information asymmetry tends to rise when the target 
size increases. Then again, when target firm is significant addition to the bidding firm it 
is more likely that the offer is made using common stock, because it diminishes the risk 
of asymmetric information. All else kept equal, this reasoning implies that the bigger 
the acquirer is compared to the target more willing is it to make a cash offer as the target 
is less significant additions to the firm. And when the target size increases stock financ-
ing should become a more likely option, which in addition to other factors might be due 
to a lack of usable free cash. Whereas, the geographic distance of the deal participants 
has found to be positively correlated with asymmetric information. (Martin 1996; Han-
sen 1987 Raggozino and Reuer 2011: 879). 
 
 
2.2. Development of hypotheses 
 
Statistically most solid evidence on weather M&A´s can create excess value, or does it 
destroy shareholders value can be gathered by executing an event study where abnormal 
stock market reactions are measured before and after the merger announcement. In an 
efficient capital market that corresponds to public information share prices should 
quickly react to a merger announcement, in other words incorporate any value change to 
stock caused by the merger.  Under the efficient market hypothesis the whole price ef-
fect of the merger should be incorporated into share prices by the merger completion, in 
other words by the time when all the uncertainty is resolved. (Anderade, Mitchell and 
Stafford 2001: 109-110.) 
 
A great part of literature that researches mergers and acquisition and whether they cre-
ate value for the acquirer (also known as bidder returns) use an event study methodolo-
gy. The event in here is equal to the announcement of the takeover. In these event stud-
ies the abnormal returns of the acquirer are measured and compounded around the an-
nouncement day using different event windows. The one used in this study and seem-
ingly the most popular event window in previous papers is a three day event window, 





event. The event in here is equal to the announcement of the takeover.  The use of three-
day event window makes a use of the efficient market theory, where markets are ex-
pected to correspond quickly to any new public information. Further this information is 
expected to have an immediate impact on share prices. Another commonly used win-
dow is a longer window – beginning several days before the announcement and ending 
when the merger is closed. (Anderade et al. 2001: 109-110). 
 
To define abnormal returns a measurement of normal returns is required. More detailed 
normal returns can be defined as expected returns experienced by the acquirer. In other 
words expected returns are the returns the acquirer would experience if the event would 
have not taken place in first place. A possible scenario is that the event does not have an 
impact on the acquirer returns; in this case the experienced returns are equal to the ex-
pected returns and the abnormal returns equal to zero. There are various ways to define 
expected returns of a security. The main difference between the methods used to evalu-
ate expected returns concern the exploration of available data. In this paper three meth-
ods are used to define expected (normal) returns. The methods are the market model, the 
mean adjusted return method and the market adjusted return method. The differences 
between these methods are presented in chapter 6.  
 
After defining expected returns for each acquirer the abnormal returns (AR´s) can be 
determined. The definition of abnormal returns is quite simple, though calculating these 
ARs is dependent on the method chosen to define normal returns. Abnormal returns are 
the reflection of the unexpected movements in any security, here in the acquirer’s stock 
price. In other words abnormal returns are any negative or positive returns that differ 
from the expected rate of return. (Kohtari and Warner 2006; 12). 
 
Later the abnormal returns (ARs) are summed together over the event window to cap-
ture the whole presence of the event. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is used as 
measurement of the impact that the event (takeovers) has on acquirer´s stock price. The 
main intuitive of this research is to solve if there is an existence of abnormal returns 
during the event window (at the time of the takeover announcement) for the acquirer. 
The ARs and the CARs are measured individually for all of the 203 deals in the sample. 
These results are further combined together to resolve average impute merger an-
nouncements have in the Nordic financial market.  
 
General principles of inferential statistics are followed, where in this study the null hy-





found within the event window.  That is to say, the null hypothesis is to test that the 
mean abnormal performance of the acquirer equals to zero. The alternative hypothesis 
(H1) states that there is, on average an existence of ARs during the event window. 
Mathematically, this is expressed as follows:  
 
H0:µ=0                       (1) 
 
H1:µ≠0                       (2) 
 
Furthermore, under this framework more specified hypothesis about the outcomes of 
M&A transactions are presented. The sample is divided into detailed subsamples to dis-
cover what factors are most relevant in successful takeover transaction from the point of 
view of maximizing acquirer’s shareholder value.  
 
2.2.1. Positive net present investment hypothesis  
 
The aim of this testable proposition is to evaluate if M&A transactions on average add 
value to the investors. If the AR´s and the CAR´s measured from the acquirer’s stock 
price reaction around the announcement day of the acquisition are found to be on aver-
age positive considering the whole sample this hypothesis holds, otherwise it is rejected. 
The hypotheses takes the following form:  
 
H1: M&A transactions have on average a positive net present value as an investment 
 
2.2.2. Target ownership structure hypothesis 
 
As presented in various previous studies it is found that on average public-to-private 
deals cumulate more positive stock market reactions to the public acquirer than public-
to-public deals. These abnormal acquirer returns are measured from the acquirer’s stock 
price reaction around the announcement day of the acquisition.  
 
H2: Ownership structure of the target has an impact on acquirer returns 
 
The aim of hypothesis H2 is to review if there is a statistically significant difference 
between deals where both the acquirer and the target are listed firms, i.e. firms where 





er is listed, but the target is a privately held firm. To clarify, these two different types of 
deals are referred as public-to-public and public-to-private deals.  
 
Next, more detailed testable propositions about the ownership structure of the target are 
presented. First we combine the positive net present investment hypothesis to the own-
ership structure of the target:  
 
H2a: Abnormal acquirer returns are positive when the target is private 
H2b: Abnormal acquirer returns are positive when the target is public 
 
Secondly we move on to test if there is a difference in acquirer returns between the two 
subsamples:  
 
H2c: Acquirer returns are on average higher in public-to-private deals than on public-   
to-public deals 
 
H2d: Acquirer returns are on average higher in public-to-public deals than on public-
to-private deals 
 
If a statistical difference between the two subsamples is found this could be explained 
by factors such as liquidity, agency problems or lack of them, the nature of the infor-
mation, limited competition, publicity factors, and misvaluation of the assets. These 
theories that explain the relationship between target ownership structure and acquirer 
performance are presented in Chapter 3.1.  
 
2.2.3. Method of payment hypothesis 
 
Various previous studies state that acquirer returns are dependent on how the transaction 
is financed. Most traditionally the M&A deals are divided into three groups based on 
the payment method of the deal. The target can be acquired with cash, common stocks 
of the acquirer, or with a mix of cash and common stocks.  
 
H3: Method of payment has an impact on acquisition returns 
 
In this hypothesis (H3) it is tested if there is a difference to be found on the level of ab-





deals and mix deals. Additionally the method of payment is considered from the per-
spective of positive net present investment:  
 
H3a: Abnormal acquirer returns are positive when the deal is financed with cash  
H3b: Abnormal acquirer returns are positive when the deal is financed with stock  
H3c: Abnormal acquirer returns are positive when the deal is financed with mix pay-
ment 
 
If statistically significant difference between these subsamples is found this could be 
explained with theories based on contingency pricing effect, signalling theory, risk ad-
verting, information characteristics, valuation of assets, and differences in merger moti-
vations. The payment method of the takeover deal and theories interpreting the relation-
ship between ownership structure of the target and acquirer performance is presented in 
Chapter 3.2.  
 
2.2.4. The block holder hypothesis 
 
According to Chang (1998) and others following, the superior performance of private 
firm acquisitions financed with stock can be explained with enhanced monitoring pow-
er. When the deal is financed with stock the sell side might become large block holder 
of the combined entity, in other words the ownership becomes more concentrated.  
Hence, the block holders may monitor the management more closely and add value to 
the combined entity. The block holder hypothesis is tested with sample of Nordic firm 
acquisitions, taking the following form:  
 
H4: acquirers of private target´s gain more when the deal is closed with common stock   
 
If cash payment is found to generate more positive abnormal returns for the private firm 
acquirers with in the sample the bloc holder hypothesis is rejected in the Nordic takeo-
ver market.  
 
2.2.5. Geographic distance hypothesis  
 
Geographic distance between the target and the acquirer is found to have an impact on 
acquirer returns (see for instance Grote and Umber 2006). Geographic distance between 





other lower the costs are.  This implies that domestic M&A deals are more affordable 
for the acquirer and therefore perform better than cross-border deals.The study address-
es this with the following statement:   
 
H3: Geographic distance between the acquirer and the target diminish on acquirer re-
turns.  
 
Additionally, there are other assumptions about the correlation between other deal char-
acteristic and the geographical distance. Sample screening of earlier studies show that 
acquisitions are more likely to be financed with cash when the acquisition is cross-
border and that in cross-border acquisitions it is more common that the target is listed 
than private. In section 5.2 we evaluate if these assumptions hold within the Nordic 
takeover market.  
 
H3a: Acquisitions are more likely to be financed with cash when the acquisition is 
cross-border 
 








3. ABNORMAL ACQUIRER RETURNS  
 
Acquisitions and mergers are corporate events that signal information to the market 
about the value of its parties involved. To capture the impact of the event the ambition 
is to solve how the market reacts to the new information, which in this case is the take-
over announcement. To define abnormal acquirer returns, it can be stated that abnormal 
returns are considered to be any positive or negative fluctuation that differ from the ex-
pected rate of return of the security. So, to measure if there is an existence of abnormal 
returns we first need to define the expected rate of return (also referred as the normal 
rate of return). To do so, asset-pricing models are used and multiple valuation and long 
run historical data are exploited to get accurate estimations of the expected rate of re-
turn.  (Chang 1998). 
 
According to the rules of the efficient market theory, it can be stated that when the 
M&A market is competitive, the net present value (NPV) of a project is zero. In this 
case the NPV in a competitive acquisition market would equal to zero and there would 
be no existence of abnormal returns. That said, any financial market is never fully com-
petitive and there are always winners and losers when it comes to investing. Abnormal 
acquirer returns can be viewed as a reflection of the unexpected economic rents origi-
nating from the transaction. Therefore, average abnormal returns settling to zero can be 
said to be a situation where the acquirer breaks even. In other words it is a fair rate of 
return for the investment. (Anderade 2001: 119). 
 
3.1. Target´s ownership structure 
 
Various studies provide evidence that targets ownership status has an impact on acquir-
er returns (See for instance Faccio et al. 2006, Koherns 2004, Capron and Shen 2007). 
Firms can be divided in two groups while defining the ownership structure. Public firms 
(also known as listed firms) are firms which shares can be publicly traded in the stock 
market. Selling or buying listed stock happens true authorised stock exchange where the 
seller and the buyers remain anomalous. Whereas private firms (also known as unlisted 
firms) are much less liquid as the exchange of these stocks is restricted. Privately held 





the valuation of unlisted firms is a more complex process, as they do not have viewable 
market price as their public peers.  
 
3.1.1. Choosing between private and public targets 
 
Information availability  
 
Information left unshared between buyer and seller may be crucial to the success or 
failure of the takeover transaction. This crucial information includes for instance, 
growth prospects of the target, insight on target’s human capital, key technologies, spe-
cific knowledge of brand value and key account relationships to customers and other 
firms. Hence, the buyer often has a logical assumption that the seller will withhold in-
formation that would lower its value and highlight information that is positively corre-
lated with high valuation. Occurrence of this phenomenon may be especially evident in 
case of acquisitions because it is a one-shot type of a transaction. That is to say the sell-
er does not care about its possible risk of losing its reputation. (Raggozino and Reuer 
2011: 877- 878). 
 
According to previously mentioned reasons information asymmetries may lead to one or 
mix of the following outcomes. Acquisition will be left undone, even if it would make 
financial and strategic sense. Or sellers must agree to discounted offer prices causing its 
shareholders to lose value, whereas buyer side must face the risk of unfavourable selec-
tion and face the possibility of miss valuation. (Raggozino and Reuer 2011: 877- 878). 
 
When comparing the acquisition between public and private firm’s one of the aspects is 
the quality and quantity of information available. For bidders, gathering information is 
much more accessible when it comes to public firms. Whereas in private firms the man-
agers have a bigger influence on the information they want to communicate outside of 
the company. (Capron & Shen 2007:893; Reuer and Raggozino 2011: 887). 
 
Capron et al. (2007) findings state that acquirers choose between public and private tar-
gets based on deal attributes (information availability) and the target attributes. When 
the industry is familiar to the acquirer they are more likely to prefer private targets and 
when entering to a new field of business domains or industries acquirers rather seek 






Chang (1998) talks about the role of information in target selection. When publicly 
traded target with a large number of shareholders faces a stocks offer the acquirer might 
experience problems with asymmetric information. In their study Myers and Majluf 
(1984) demonstrate how issuing equity to the public may reduce the stock prices when 
managers of the firm possess superior information about their stock.  Their asymmetric 
information model states that managers of the bibbing firm make stock offers when they 
are under the expectation that their firm is overvalued. Their willingness to give up their 
stake may lead a negative stock price reaction in the stock market if the investors as-
sume that they find their stock overvalued.  
 
Furthermore, when stock is used the shareholders of the target firm are more willing to 
collaborate with the bidder firm as after the merger they will end up holding notable 
amount of the bidding firm´s stocks. This creates a situation where the best interest of 
the acquirer is also in the best interest of the target firm owners. Chang (1998) also 
points out that the competition for privately held targets is limited, which makes it pos-
sible for bidding firms to experience positive stock returns because of the likely-hood of 
underpaying for the target rises due to a lack of a competition. Chang names this as the 
limited competition hypothesis. (Chang 1998: 774). 
 
Firm ownership status also creates information asymmetries from a regulation perspec-
tive. In most countries, including the Nordic countries there is wide set of laws and reg-
ulations how firms should report on their business. Usually these regulations are much 
more specific and strict for firms which shares are publicly traded than for those that are 
privately owned. The regulated information expressed outside the company from the 
listed firms include information such as the stock exchanges’ feed on regulatory news 
services and regulations to obey a certain type of format of reporting when handing out 
annual reports. Analysts also cover news and speculate the performance of listed firms 
in a much wider range compered to their private peers. With analysts´ coverage and 
reporting regulations public firms are under a much bigger microscope than firms which 
stock remain in a private market. This diminishes the risk misevaluation on public tar-
gets. (Ekkayokkaya et al. 2009: 1203-1204). 
 
Listed firms also tend to have stronger ties to investment banks and there they possess 
greater coverage by analysts. Listed firms are also often better known than their private 
peers and therefore get more coverage by the press compared to private firms which 
increases their visibility to the market. These factors included to the fact that public tar-





also likely that investors are less aware of the existence of private firms due to less visi-
ble characteristics. For private firms it may be difficult to find exchange partners be-
cause they are not well known by the investment community. (Capron et al. 2007: 893).  
 
It is clear that information disparities exist. Evidence suggests that managers have a 
firm tendency to highlight positive information and fade out negative news when they 
can. An unlisted firm has much weaker regulatory requirements that a listed one when it 
comes to information. This leaves more room for alternation of information for manag-
ers/owners of unlisted targets before and during the bidding process. The lack of regula-
tion of a target firm also makes it easier for the bidder side managers to bury their pos-
sible personal motives concerning the deal. (Kothari et al. 2009; Ekkayokkaya, Holmes 
& Paudyal 2009: 2102). 
 
The lack of information involved in buying a private target causes a risk of overpayment 
for the acquirer. The logical response to this risk and to the adverse selection is to lower 
the bidding price. This phenomenon is named as the private firm discount. By under-
standing the private firm discount the favourable market reaction of acquiring private 




The valuation of unlisted firms is often a highly subjective and difficult process. What 
makes a private firm different from a listed one is that a privately held firm has no ob-
servable stock price that could serve as an objective measure of the market value.  To 
define the value of an unlisted company analyst must seek other techniques for valua-
tion. These techniques cannot guarantee a cure for uncertainty. (Koeplin, Sarin & 
Shapiro 2000: 94).  
 
The most commonly used and theoretically correct approach of valuing any assets, in-
cluding companies, is the use of discounted cash flow (DCF) methodology. The issue is 
that the use DFC requires a use of discount rate and defining this rate is complex. Also 
prediction of cash flows is a part of the DFC method and this causes the method to be 
dependent on the accuracy of these future predictions and appropriate risk measures that 
should be used are hard to define. Even though there are many limitations in the DFC 
values these may be useful when used together with other valuation approaches. 






Ownership structure  
 
The pre-takeover ownership structure of private target is often very concentrated com-
pared to listed targets. Chang (1998) names a beneficial block holder as an owner that 
holds more than five percent of the outstanding shares. Chang (1998) argues that the 
concentrated ownership structure of the target tends to create the block holders when  
stock bids are made.  Moreover, evidence shows that bidding firm’s returns tend to 
positively correlate with the existence of target side block holders. This is consistent 
with the idea that large shareholders serve as an effective monitoring tool for the new 
combined entity and its managerial performance. (Chang 1998: 776, 783). 
 
There are opposite views on concentrated ownership, some argue that concentrated 
ownership leads to private benefits of control. Private benefits of control is a phenome-
non where owners/managers of the firm are more driven by their own interest than the 
best interest of all shareholders. Thus, Immonen (2014) claims that the corporate gov-
ernance models in Nordic countries are in contrast to many global models. Where the 
ownership structure in Nordic countries remains fairly concentrated, it has been reported 
that in Nordic corporate governance the private benefits of control still remain some-
what unused. Low levels of private benefits in the Nordics have been, among others 




The negotiation process between the bidder and the target is often a long and complex 
process. As this process may sometimes be costly it will lift up the expenses of the deal, 
diminishing the value of the deal. The less public nature of private target deals gives the 
parties (seller and buyer) often more space to proceed at a more deliberate pace, and 
acquirer do not feel the pressure to break off the negations quickly and can therefore be 
saved from high prestige expenses. (Koherns 2004: 1152.)  
 
Lack of marketability 
 
For investors liquidity can be seen as the ease in which they are able to realise their as-
sets e.g. stocks or bonds without causing damage to the value of their initial investment. 
Compared to a listed company a privately held company has a limited amount of inves-
tors willing to buy equity for them which makes selling of these unlisted stocks more 





This phenomenon is also known as lack of marketability. In order to find an investor 
that is willing to buy assets that lack marketability a discount may be required to cover 
the disadvantage caused by the liquidity risk.  This reduction of the offer price arising 
from unlisted nature of the assets is referred as liquidity or marketability discount. (De-
Pamphilis 2012:384).  
 
Officer (2006) calls this phenomenon as the price of corporate liquidity. Maintaining 
liquidity does not come without a price for corporations and for their owners. It seems 
that companies whose stocks are publicly traded possess larger cash balances compared 
to their privately held peers. Whereas, it is more difficult for shareholders of private 
firms to access the public pool of capital where they could diversify their portfolios. In 
other words privately held firms lack an easy access to the market where they could sell 
their stocks to the public.  
 
Officer (2006) provides two explanations for the causes of liquidity shortcomings. An 
information disparity between unlisted firms and public markets is one explanation. 
Secondly, there appears to be an information shortage caused by the agency problems 
between shareholders and managers that may lead to decreased liquidity. The cost for 
liquidity can arise from only one or the combination of these two explanations. Despite 
the price, findings indicate that liquidity is highly appreciated in the M&A market. Es-
pecially when the transaction includes selling or buying unlisted assets liquidity is al-
ways under examination. (Officer 2007: 572-573).  
 
3.1.2. Target´s ownership structure and acquirer returns  
 
Previous evidence states that on average acquirers of unlisted targets gain positive re-
turns around the announcement date whereas public-to-public acquisitions hardly break 
even. Although, it could be stated that these abnormal acquirer returns are not sustaina-
ble in the long run. (See e.g. Ekkayokkaya et al. 2009). Few previous studies offer find-
ings about the long-term wealth effect of acquisitions. Thus these findings are hardly 
ever statistically significant. Due to the data limitations and the uncertainty of previous 
long-term findings the focus of this study is on the announcement period.   
 
Most previous studies researching the success of mergers and acquisitions and whether 
these transactions can create value to shareholders use an event study methodology to 





announcement of the transaction should immediately reflect on stock prices. Table 1. 
presents previous literature studies on cumulative abnormal acquirer returns. Most of 
these papers are conducted with a US based data set and the most common event win-
dow in use is three days. (Anderade et al. 2001.) 
 
 
Table 1. Previous papers on abnormal acquirer returns on public-to-public deals and 
private-to-private deals  
Study Origin 
Time  Event  Public target Private target  
Period Window Abnormal returns  Abnormal returns  
 
      
  
Hansen & Lott 1996 US 1985-1990 -14, +5 0.98 1.15 
Koherns 2004 US 1984-1997 0, +1 -0.53** 1.30** 
Faccio & Mahulis 2005 US 1990-2003 -2, +2 -1.48** 0.76** 
Draper & Padyal 2006 UK 1981-2001 -1, +1 -0.41** 0.81** 
Capron & Shen 2007 Global 1988-1992 -20, +1 -1.70 1,00 
Officer et al. 2008 US 1995-2004 -1, +1 NA 3.80** 
Ekkayokkaya et al.  UK 1991-2007 -1, +1 -0.045** 1.423** 
Mateev 2016 Europe 2002-2010 -1, +1 -0.15** 0.99** 
            
The studies are ranked first by publishing year. All abnormal returns are abnormal cumulative return (CARs) for the 




As can be easily detected from Table 1, acquirers of private targets performed better 
than those acquirers of public targets in every one of these studies. Even though the em-
pirical evidence of these previous findings shows similar wealth effects on average, the 
value creation of M&A transactions is not a clear cut. Fuller et al. (2002) underline the 
extreme variation in acquirer returns. This variation is not easily detectable from these 
empirical findings presented in Table 1. as these results are average figures of hundreds 
if not thousands abnormal acquirer returns and therefore do not show the full potential 
of losing or winning in the M&A game.  
 
Muhlerin and Boone (2000) conducted a study with a data set from the nineties cover-
ing 1305 acquisitions. They measure combined stock price reactions at the announce-
ment and find that both divestitures and acquisitions create wealth. They use a tree day 
event window around the announcement day and report an average 20.2 percent return 
for the target firm, and a slightly negative thus insignificant bidder return. Muhlerin´s 





quirer is significantly related to the combined bidder and target returns. They state that 
the wealth effects of the bidder and the target can be directly related to size of the take-
over and that the wealth effect can be explained with synergies of the transaction. 
(Muhlerin et al. 2000).  
 
Various other studies prior to Muhlerin´s and Boone´s are mostly in agreement with 
findings on the acquirer returns of public-to-public deals. Bradley, Dessai, and Kim 
(1988) compare acquirer returns over decades and found that the average 4 percent re-
turn in the 1960s fell to an average 1.3 percent in the 1970s and in the 1980s sank as 
low as -3 percent (all of these figures are statistically significant). For the combined 
gains that consider both the outcomes of the target and the bidder, the study found posi-
tive and statically significant results for all the decades mentioned. However, all the 
data sets under surveillance only included US based deals. (Fuller et al. 2002: 1767; et 
al. 1988). Likewise to Mulherin et al. (2000) most of the studies listed in Table 1. report 
positive wealth effects when returns for the acquirer and the target are combined. Nev-
ertheless almost all of the previous studies listed in the table find that acquirer returns 
on public-to-public deals are on average negative. 
 
The results that indicate negative gains for acquirers raise a question why do firms make 
acquisitions if the returns are not on average positive. Several possible explanations 
have been expressed. In a competitive corporate control market where firms are ex-
pected to earn “normal” returns from their operations, these zero returns are typical. 
Bruner (2001 p.14) found that on average “60 to 70 percent of all M&A transactions are 
associated with financial performance that at least compensates investors for their op-
portunity cost”. In addition, even though on average acquirer returns are small, there 
exists a huge variation in these returns and it can be stated that all of the firms on the 
bidding side of acquisitions are trying to be the one that wins. (Weston 2001: 221; 
Brunner: 2001: 14; Faccio et al 2002: 1767).  
 
In addition, estimating bidder returns contains many difficulties. If the target is relative-
ly small compared to the acquirer the acquisition may only have a small impact on the 
bidder´s stock price even though the takeover would be successful. Secondly, it has to 
be noted that bidder´s stock price reaction only reflects the surprise component arising 
from the takeover. If it is a known fact in the market that the bidder is engaging in an 
acquisition, the stock price reaction to an acquisition announcement is only the distin-
guished difference on how the acquisition was anticipated to go and how it actually 





it makes the outcome of the takeover more uncertain, and it becomes harder to isolate 
the market´s perception of the deal. (Fuller et al. 2002: 1767). 
 
Abnormal acquirer returns of private target acquisition are much less studied subject 
than the wealth effect of public-to-public deals. As can be detected from table 1. many 
previous findings show that the market reacts more favourably to acquisition of unlisted 
targets compared to acquisition of listed firms. Finance scholars have labelled this phe-
nomenon as The Private Firm Discount. This means that compared to public firms bid-
der can buy private targets at a relatively cheaper price. The discount makes the split of 
value between the target and acquirer more advantageous for the buying side. Koeplin et 
al. (2002) state that unlisted firms are on average bought 18 percent (book multiples) or 
20-30 percent (earnings multiples) cheaper than equivalent listed firms. Kooli, Kortas 
and L`Her (2003) find even higher discount for private targets, averaging to 20 percent 
measured with cash flow multiples and 34 percent with earnings multiples. However, it 
is good to take into account that these studies suffer from theoretical and methodologi-
cal difficulties. (Capron et al. 2007: 873; Koeplin et al. 2000; Kooli Kotras and L`Her 
2003). 
 
Where the existence of private firm discount has been proven, the explanation on what 
causes the discount is not as clear. In addition, measuring the private company discount 
is a difficult process, as the private firms do not have an observable market price as ob-
jective measure of their market value. As mentioned before the most well-known expla-
nation used to explain the discount associated with private targets cover the price of 
liquidity and information availability. (Fuller et al. 2002; Capron and Shen 2007: 893).  
 
The existence of active stock exchange market makes it possible for owners of public 
targets a readily available option to cash out their stock in the market rather than sell 
them to a possible acquirer. Whereas the selling of restricted stock is more difficult as 
they don´t possess the similar access to the financial markets. If a private firm owner 
wishes to cash out, often the only and rather disadvantageous option is to find an ac-
quirer willing to buy the company. Empirical studies have not found to support the li-
quidity discount hypothesis, which indicates that it is not the core of the superior per-
formance found to be attached to acquisition private targets or at least liquidity effect on 
its own cannot explain the abnormal positive returns linked to public-to-private acquisi-
tions. Most previous empirical studies agree that the private firm discount is a combina-
tion of liquidity factors and information availabilities. The role of information is not 





an impact on the value-creation process in many different phases of the takeover trans-
action. In addition, the private nature of the target also affects the bargaining power be-
tween the seller and the buyer. (Faccio et al. 2006; Capron and Shen 2007). 
 
 
3.2. Method of payment 
 
There are multiple factors can affect acquirer´s stock prices. One of the most important 
and studied factors in understanding effect of M&A´s is the method of payment in 
which the takeover is financed with. Acquirers, which assets are publicly trades i.e. are 
listed have the option to choose from several means of financing a takeover. Regularly 
used payment methods are cash, newly issued notes, full voting right shares, inferior 
voting right shares, non-contingent liabilities and any combination of these. To simpli-
fy, the methods of payment in M&A research these methods are often divided in tree 
groups; stock offers, cash offers or mixed offers. When only common stock is used as a 
payment this financing category is referred as STOCK. When the price is paid solely on 
cash, cash and straight depth, or cash combined to the target firm´s liabilities, the term 
CASH is in use. Whereas the term MIXED refers to any type of mix to these prior two.  
(Martin 1996: 1235). 
 
3.2.1. Choosing a payment method 
 
From the perspective of the acquirer stock financing can be seen as two simultaneous 
corporate events: as a merger and as an equity issue. Equity issues on average are linked 
to negative abnormal returns ranging around -2 to -3 percent around few days from the 
issue. Most models explaining this phenomenon focus on information differences be-
tween outside investors and managers of the equity-issuing firm. Simply this means that 
managers are more likely to issue equity when they might think their stock is overvault-
ed than undervalued in the market. In other words the perceive information that is nega-
tively correlated with the share price that has not yet reach the market. Simultaneously 
investors who are keen on investing to equity issue bid down the share price of the issu-
ing firm. There for is recommended to separate equity financed mergers from the ones 
that are financed with cash when observing the wealth effect, especially for the share-






Another way to look at the method of payment is to evaluate how contributes of acquir-
ing firm, target firm and the acquisition itself impact to the financing decision. Im-
portant issue in Martin´s study (1996) is to find out the motive for the acquirer to use 
stock instead of cash.  Martin found that there is a relationship between the likelihood of 
stock financing and lower managerial ownership, thus this relationship is non-linear. 
Vice versa stronger the institutional block holders the bigger change there is that cash is 
used instead of stock financing. This so called agency theory is introduced further on.   
(Martin 1996: 1227,1229). 
 
Hansen (1987) offers explanation where “contingency pricing effect” is introduced. 
When common stock is used it forces the target’s shareholders to carry part of the risk 
that arises from the possibility that acquirer overpaid for the deal.  If the target has more 
information of the actual value of its company than the bidder acquirer can use stock 
payment as a way to force the target to carry the wage of the possible post-acquisition 
effects that could lead to revaluation. Here for using stock as a method of payment in-
stead of cash can be seen as a risk-sharing tool between the two parties. (Martin 
1999:1230; Hansen 1987)  
 
Raggozino and Reuer (2001) also state that using stock instead of cash is a way to di-
minish risk arising from information asymmetry. This way the target is forced to share 
the misfortunes and fortunes that take place after deal is closed.  They also offer reasons 
why stock financing may be a favourable option for seller side; when the seller side 
believes it holds important information about the value of their resources but are not 
able express this value to the buyer in credible manner in the negotiations. In other 
words stock financing offers the seller side to benefit from their “silent” information 
after the deal is closed. (Raggozino and Reuer 2011: 878). 
 
Although choice of payment is in many ways strategic decision cash availability plays a 
role. Mayers (1984) offered a pecking order theory where he states that managers follow 
a pattern when it comes to financing. First choice is internal finance, followed by bor-
rowing and only after then external equity financing is considered. There for high cash 
balances may lead to more likely change to use cash as an acquisition currency. This 
means that firms with adequate depth rations, good cash balances or generous cash 
flows are often temped to use cash while acquiring. Martin (1996) supports this hypoth-
esis all though he only found the cash availability variables to be significant at the 0,05 





son to the deals size, greater the change is that the acquisition is financed with cash. 
(Jensen & Ruback 1986: 30- 33; Mayers 1984: 1231).   
 
As stated, choosing cash financing is not necessary a strategic decision. Among others 
Servaes (1991) provide evidence that firms with excess cash flows choose to acquire 
with cash and this respectively can lead to overbidding and destructs the value of the 
deal. This use off excess cash is a sign of managerial empire building. Even though us-
ing excess cash to reinvest to M&As have been shown to be value destructing activity. 
Bruner (1988) states that by pairing slack-poor and slack-rich firms can create value. 
Thus here the cost of the acquirer returns is a lowered depth ratio. (Georgen and 
Renneborg 2004: 12; Servaes 1991; Bruner 2001: 10). 
 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) concentrate on the European M&A market. Their evidence is 
consistent with the Anglo-American studies as they find that target and deal characteris-
tics play a significant role when acquirers make a choice in the method of payment. Un-
like most studies they also evaluate the choice of payment method from the point of 
view of the seller. Receiving stocks instead of cash has more tax benefits, but the trade-
off for stock financing is the liquidity and risk-minimizing factors of cash consideration. 
Thus, the trade-off between risk bearing that arises from becoming a minority owner of 
the bidder firm and tax benefits for accepting stock is hard to measure due to a data lim-
itations. (Faccio and Masoulis 2005: 1345-1346). 
 
The choice between stock and cash is also often a choice between equity and depth, as 
cash often requires depth financing. Also the structure of corporate governance has es-
sential impact on a bidder´s financing choice. When stock is used as a merger currency 
it alters the voting power of the shareholders of the acquiring firm. Bidder management 
prefers cash financing if they are reluctant to diminish their control. This appears espe-
cially in cases where the targets ownership structure is very concentrated. The most vul-
nerable are bidder´s acquiring firms where the largest shareholder of the target has vot-
ing power between 20% -60%. When stock is used as a payment method, this level of 
concentrated ownership might mean a makeable loss of control for the buyer side. The 
more diffusely owned the target is the less the controlling block of the bidder is threat-
ened. (Faccio & Masulis 2005: 1347.) 
 
Stultz (1988) reported statistically significant negative relationship between acquirer’s 
manager ownership measures and stock financing. The same findings are confirmed by 





targets to the analysis while other studies only use sample of listed targets when evalu-
ating the link between ownership structure and the method of payment. Thus, Martins 
sample is a mix of privately and privately owned companies he does not differentiate 
the result between these two groups. (Martin 1996, Stultz 1988, Faccio & Masoulis 
2005.) 
 
Although in this thesis the focus is on choosing between cash or stock financing there 
are alternative method payments for M&A´s. One way to alter the ownership still taking 
into consideration the risks acquirer faces is to use so called Earn-out contracts. In mer-
ger negations disagreements between the acquirer and the target about the target value 
are more than common. This valuation differences become even more evident if the 
target value is attached to its human resources, such as key target managers who may 
not be willing to stay in the company after the transaction has taken place. This problem 
is solved with two-part payment where the target receives to first payment at the time of 
merger announcement, and second payment when the target side full fills certain con-
tract bidden obligations, this second part can be referred as the earn-out. The earn-out 
gives the parties change to close a deal even when they disagree about the valuation; 
target with high expectations of its future prospects is willing to accept contingent pay-
ment, while the acquirer with limited information is willing to sift part of the risk to 
target.   (Koherns & Ang 2000: 445-446.) 
 
In addition, Martin (1996) builds an investment opportunity hypothesis. This theory 
links corporate borrowing activity to firm’s prospective growth opportunities. His theo-
ry  is strongly based on the assumption that value of future investments defines the val-
ue of the firm. His findings indicate that acquirers with high growth prospects are more 
reluctant to use cash as an investment currency. This is probably because the want to 
use free cash flows to finance their growth opportunities, in other words they rather fi-
nance the mergers with stock. In the same study Martin (1996) evaluates if business 
cycles have an impact on the method of payment. He finds that greater use of stock fi-
nancing when stock market is booming. (Martin 1996: 1229, 1233.) 
 
3.2.2. Method of payment and acquirer returns 
 
What makes the method of payment interesting is that previous studies document that 
acquisitions often cause negative price reactions to acquiring firms share price. In other 





Martin (1996), Anderade (2001) all report that on average acquirer’s gain negative re-
turns while acquiring.  Studies on M&As show that the method of payment plays a cru-
cial role explaining the stock returns of the bidding firm. Even the early results of Trav-
los (1987) show that firms financing a takeover with common stock simulate negative 
abnormal returns whereas deals financed with cash this negative price reaction for bid-
der loses its existence. (Chang 1998:773.) 
 
These results do not take the characteristics of the target into consideration. More spe-
cific research shows that the ownership status of the target has a crucial role when eval-
uation the wealth effects. Further, private-targets acquisition seem to have an opposite 
wealth reactions to stock financing compared to acquisition of public firms. As can be 
seen from Table 2. previous findings indicate that on average bidders acquiring private 
targets with common stock experience positive abnormal return. This highly in contrasts 
with the negative abnormal return earned when acquiring public targets with stock of-
fers. When private-target deal is closed with cash most studies indicate average zero 
abnormal returns.  (Chang 1998.) 
 
 
Table 2.  Previous studies on abnormal acquirer returns and the payment method effects  







dow    
CAR 
(%)     
CAR 
(%) 
        cash stock mix cash  stock mix 
Travlos 1987 US 1972-1981 -10, +10 -0,13 -1,6 NA NA NA NA 
Serveas1991 US 1972-1987 -1, NA 3,44 -5,86 -3,7 NA NA NA 
Chang 1998 US 1981-1992 -1, 0 -0,02 -2,46** NA 0,09 2,64** NA 





Anderade et al. 2001  US 1973-1998 -1, +1 0,40 -1,50** NA NA NA NA 
Praper & Padyal 
2006 UK 
1992-
1998 -1, +1 -0,32 2,20* NA 0,64* 0,84* NA 
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Key: One * refers to significance level at the 5 percent level, respectively ** indicate significance level of 1 percent. 
NA equals to not available. 
 
Also Koherns (2004) agree that the negative stock reaction found with acquirers using 





tive value reaction does not extend to acquirers of private targets. Notable remark is that 
owners of private firms are often willing to accept lower premiums when they get some 
cash as a part of the transaction, this applies to both mixed offers and cash offers. Previ-
ous cross-sectional studies also show that the superior performance of private target 
acquirers do not come as expense of the target firm returns and vice versa. (Koherns 
2004: 1160-1164.)  
 
Studies in Table 2. are ranked firstly by publishing year. Orgin refers to the area where 
the data is gathered. As can be seen most of these results are based in US and UK. 
Mateev (2016) study cover Europe thus his sample only include firms from Continental 
Europe.  Most abnormal return presented in table 2. abnormal cumulative return (CARs) 
of the acquirer based on an event study. Capron’s and Shen´s results are exception as 
the results are approximate figures. Also approach Ekkoyokkaya et al. (2008) and 
Praper & Padyal (2006) is different compared to other studies presented in the table as 
they use an buy-and-hold method in framework of Jense´s Alpha to calculate the ab-
normal returns instead of an event study.  
 
In section 3.2.3. it is stated that acquirers of private targets perform better that acquirers 
of listed firms. When more detail information about the deal as the method of payment 
is given it can be marked that in both cash and stock financing private-target deals the 
returns are positive and significant. From table X it can be seen that this is a sharp con-
trast to findings related to public-target acquisition. Chang (1998) report a positive ab-
normal return of 2,64% in a case of equity financed private-target deals. Later research-
es follow with similar result, indicating the superior performance of stock financing in a 
case of acquiring unlisted targets. However, there is a existence of result showing higher 
returns for cash financed deals. For example Koherns (2004) find that more positive 
stock reactions is generated with cash instead of stock. Explanation for these differences 
may rely on differences in sample selection criteria or with authors’ definition on meth-
od of payment.  
 
As most previous studies agree that stock financing is the more beneficial option while 
acquiring unlisted targets. The focus here is on causes driving these results.  Chang pro-
poses that the positive wealth effect arising for acquiring private targets is related to 
monitoring activities done by shareholders of the target, and to some level to reduced 
information asymmetries. Draper and Paudyal (2006) call this phenomenon as the Cor-
porate Monitoring Hypothesis. This Hypothesis rely on the assumption that private tar-





shareholders of the new entity due to the stock financed deal they can form effective 
blocks to monitor the activities of the firm and its managerial performance. Block hold-
ers can also make the takeover process less complex. On the other hand, block holders 
may also cause damage to the firm value; more concentrated ownership structure may 
allow managerial entrenchment, which can make takeovers more costly. (Chang 1998: 
774; Draper and Paudyal 2006.)  
 
Thus, the monitoring hypothesis helps to explain the positive return in stock financed 
deals, it does not provide an answer on why are these returns positive in a first place. 
Another reasoning offered to explain this phenomenon is different tax implications of 
cash and equity financed deals.  In cash offers the target side owners faces immediate 
tax obligations after selling their stake. While in deals where the owners of the target 
receive shares, the tax obligation only follow if they liquidate these assets i.e. sell the 
shares forward. When the owners of the target value this option they may be more will-
ing to except stock instead of cash and the bidder may use this as an advantage and 
make an offer with a ´taxation discount` and so on capture a higher returns from their 
stock offer. (Travlos 1987; Fuller et.al 2002.)  
 
Further, information asymmetry and signalling theories are linked to abnormal acquirer 
returns. The more concentrated ownership structure of the target also diminish the 
asymmetric information in takeover. If a shareholder has a significant stake in the firm, 
he or she has a greater motive to perform a thural research on the bidder assuming she 
or he will become an owner of the firm after the deal is closed. The willingness for the 
target to become a stake holder of the acquiring firm signals good news to the public 
witch may lead to positive price reaction in the acquirers’ stock price. (Draper and 
Padyal 2006). 
 
As for the reasons of negative stock price reaction of stock financed public target acqui-
sitions it can be noted that when a firm buys publicly traded target and pays the deal 
with common stock it resembles a public equity offering. So the wealth effect for the 
acquisition can assumed to be similar to equity issue announcements. Public equity of-
ferings are found to cause negative share price reactions to the releasing firm. (see for 
example Smith 1986 study about the equity issue announcement and the wealth effect 
related). (Chang 1998: 773.) 
The signaling hypothesis of information asymmetry assumes that the management of 
the bidding company has superior information about the true value of the target compa-





veys information about the assumed value of the target firm. Managers are expected to 
act in the best interest of their shareholders. According to the signaling theory, they will 
therefore use cash as a method of payment when they assume target firm to be under-
valued because their aim is to preserve all gains for their current shareholders. When 
managers believe the target is overvalued, they will choose stock as a method of pay-
ment because in that way current shareholders of the bidder will share risk and losses of 
the acquisition with the shareholders of the target company. After the announcement, 
market participants usually interpret stock offers as an unfavorable signal and cash as a 
favorable one. (Majluf and Myers, 1984) 
 
3.3. Targets geographic scope 
 
Deal counterparties’ geographic distance from each other has been associated with mon-
itoring costs; closer they are to one another the lower the costs are.  Geographic proxim-
ity might also open a possibility for a potential monopoly. Grote and Umber (2006) 
suggest that in the case of M&A there is more unspoken information available to ac-
quirers that are geographically close to the target. Their evidence shows that greater 
gains are earned from nearby acquisitions. This can be partly explained by information 
availability. Their sample consists of US based firms; in this study it is further tested if 
this holds within north European firms. (Grote and Umber 2006.) 
 
There is also a stream of evidence that support the claim that investors prefer to certain 
part of their portfolios to be invested in close by firms. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) 
explain this phenomenon as follows: “Local investors talk to employees, managers, and 
suppliers of the firm; they may obtain important information from the local media; and 
they may have personal ties with local executives — all of which may provide them 
with an information advantage in local stocks”. (Raggozino and Reuer 2011: 879; Coval 
and Moskowitz 1999; 2046.) 
 
Later Coval and Moskowitz (2001) found that investment decision made based on geo-
graphic distance provide superior profits. This holds even when diversifications benefits 
are lost when geographical proximity is considered. Their findings highlight the im-
portance of geographic scope when their results hold even in markets where one would 






3.4. Attributes combined  
 
 
The pre-takeover ownership structure of private target is often very concentrated com-
pared to listed targets Chang (1998) argues that in stock financed deals the prior deal 
owners of the private target may possess a block ownership in which it can be used as a 
monitoring tool for manager activities of the newly established firm. This should lower 
the future agency costs of the new firm. Whereas cash payment cannot lead to such 
monitoring due to fact that the target owner won’t become shareholders of the new firm.  
This suggests that the targets ownership structure (public or private) interacts with the 
financing (cash or stock) choice. (Ekkoyokkaya 2009: 1216). 
 
In a nutshell previous findings indicate that in short run i.e. around the merger an-
nouncement acquirers of unlisted targets gain the abnormal returns when paying with 
stock and that this gain is significantly lower when cash is used, whereas mixed pay-
ment stands somewhere in the between the two. The high gains of equity financed pri-
vate target takeovers supports corporate monitoring hypothesis. In addition, the target 
side acceptance of stock supports the idea that unlisted-target owners possess unadapt 
information that is further reflected to the deal performance. In other words their stock 
acceptance signals good news.   (Ekkayokkaya et al. 2009: 1217). 
 
Mix payment in public-to-private deals shares attributes in both stock and cash deals. 
Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) state that the long term negative returns of mixed paid pri-
vate-target deals imply that equity financed part of the deal is not enough to convince 
the market that the manager/owners of the target believe in the deal and its good quality, 
but in fact the acquisitions are done with false motives such as managers who pursue to 
empire building. (Ekkayokkaya et al. 2009: 1216). 
 
According to Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) the announcement period returns of listed-
target acquirers also depend on the method of payment. In opposite to unlisted-target 
acquirers the public-to-public deals generate more abnormal returns when financed with 
cash and suffer from significant losses when stock or mixed payment is used.  This sup-
ports the idea that managers of the bidder are more willing to use their shares as pay-
ment when they think their stock is over valuated in the market. Also the synergy gains 
of stock payment in public-to-public deals are not often enough to cover the bid premi-





also in line with the idea that issuing equity to the public signals bad news for the stock 
price. (Ekkayokkaya et al. 2009: 1218). 
 
As a conclusion, it is obvious that target ownership status and method of payment are 
strongly linked. In addition, the combination of these factors, public or private, cash or 
stock, has an evident impact on abnormal acquirer returns. However, the short-term 
announcement period results seem to vary significantly from the long-term findings. In 
general the result indicate that in a short-run unlisted-target acquirers gain more than 
listed-target acquirers in both stock financed and mixed financed deals. Whereas the 
losses are greater for the private-target acquirers in a long run when cash or mixed 
method payment is used. This is compared to public-target acquirers. The differences in 
acquirer returns between acquirer gains can be if not only at least partly explained with 
information asymmetries. Next chapters will move on testing does these results hold in 






4. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS  
Merger can be described as an event where the merging firm´s assets and liabilities are 
incorporated to a separate firm (the merged company). The exiting body looses its iden-
tity and merging firm´s shareholders become owners of the merged firm. In the process 
of merger two or more organizations join together with an aspiration to meet some stra-
tegic objective. These firms can merge parts of their firms or their whole operations. 
Thus when two companies merge one company acquirers the assets and liabilities of the 
other company whereas the merged company (or companies) looses its existence. 
(Vazirani 2015: 4).  
 
Acquisition on the other hand is a corporate event where one company (the acquirer) 
buys another company (the target) partly or as a whole in order to receive control of the 
assets and liabilities of the target firm. The objective of an acquisition is often growth. 
When a firm wants to expand its existing operations or enters a new area it may be more 
beneficial to buy a company or its operations rather than build these operations from 
scratch. Acquisitions are often divided in two groups, hostile takeovers and friendly 
takeovers.  (Vazirani 2015: 4). 
 
4.1. Motives of M&A 
 
The purpose to carry out any business is to maximise shareholder value, in other words 
increase long-term wealth of the firm.  One way to achieve growth is to increase assets, 
sales and market share by acquiring another firms. McGrath (2011) states that hardly 
any other business endeavours create such an opportunity for growth than mergers and 
acquisitions. However, these transactions also involve a vast risk of failure. According 
to McGrath’s (2011) study over half of M&A deals fail to achieve their objectives after 
or even before the deal closes. (Miroslav 2017: 191;  McGrath 2011).  
 
Previous empirical research on M&A´s is limited in explaining why mergers occur. 
Most commonly mentioned merger motives in the corporate literature research include 
use of free cash flow, synergies of operating/financial performance, hubris by the bidder 
side management, or correction of managerial failure. Value creation motives such as 
synergies can be categorized in two groups. The so-called operating synergies consist of 





vantages when the new combined merged entity has a higher value than these firms 
would have if their individual values would be summed up. An example of an informa-
tional synergy is a new internal capital market, where slack-poor firms with good 
growth opportunities can be acquired by slack-rich firms that possess more narrow in-
vestment opportunities. (Anderade et al 2001: 10; Goergen and Renneboog 2004:12; 
Koherns 2004: 1152).  
 
These explanations can be applied to mergers in general; most of them focus on public-
to-public mergers and leave out the private target takeovers out from the equation. 
However, it is possible that the motivation of doing private target acquisitions differ 
from their motives of other acquisitions. The hubris, for example may play a smaller 
role in private target takeovers compared to deals where both counterparties are listed, 
as the publicity is often a key factor causing hubris-like behaviour. As a conclusion, it 
may be stated that the diminished tendency to hubris type of motivations in private tar-
get acquisition also diminishes the risk of overpaying. Also when these value decreasing 
motivation are left out from the equations it leaves more space to synergy- related mer-
ger motives that often pay off. (Koherns 2004: 1152).  
 
One interesting question that widely remains unanswered in M&A studies is the mo-
tives of acquisitions and if these motives differ between private and public target acqui-
sitions. Since private target deals are often smaller in size and value than public target 
acquisitions these acquisition may possess less value and as a result decrease merger 
motivations such as hubris or empire building. This reasoning assumes that the private 
deals have relatively less publicity than takeovers of public targets because of the size 
factor, leaving fame and glory of the deal out from the picture. Furthermore, it is stated 
that public deals suffer less from agency problems than private target deals. (Koherns 
2004: 1152).  
 
4.2. M&A activity  
 
It’s a well-known fact that M&A activity comes in waves. One of the first researches to 
study the patterns of these waves is the study of Globe and White (1993). The amount 
of waves is controversial. Still, it is without a doubt that in corporate development mer-
gers and acquisitions are highly popular. As an example in year 2004 over 30 000 were 
recorded globally. This means that every 18 minutes a takeover deal is completed, 
bringing the combined value of these transactions to astonishing 1,900 billion dollars, 






The explanation on what causes merger waves varies widely. Where the existence of 
merger waves is obvious the causes of low and high merger activity periods can be de-
scribed as a puzzle. For example, during the period 1968-1969 there was approximately 
10,500 acquisition announcements, while in years 1936-1964 the corresponding amount 
of acquisition announcements were 3,311 in total. This is considered to be the first sig-
nificant merger wave. This phenomenon has repeated itself over the years, and most 
financial institutions agree that the financial market is now at the midst of the seventh 
M&A wave. (Cartwright and Schoenberg 2006). 
Where in the past 100 years there have been six reported waves of rapid merger activity 
in the US M&A market. The waves have been reported to be less evident in Europe 
until the 60s. The year 1986 has said to be the construction of Single Market in Europe 
and it was followed by the first truly sharp M&A wave experienced in Europe in the 
80s. The new wave took place in late 90s. The sixth worldwide boom ended short, in 
2007, when the financial crisis started in the US. (IMAA 2017) 
 
The wave of mergers and acquisitions that Europe experienced in the late 80s (1987-
1991) represented the first truly European M&A wave. This fifth worldwide wave was 
the time that cross-border deals exploded to new dimensions. The fifth takeover wave is 
also the one where the European capital markets were catching up to their US and UK 
counterparts in M&A activity levels. The next M&A (mergers and acquisitions) wave 
took place in the late 90s (1997-2000), the last wave began around 2003, but ended 
quickly in 2007, when financial crisis got started in US. 
Maksimovic, Phillips and Yang (2013) make a comparison between public and private 
firms to see if there is a difference in how they participate in M&A activity during mer-
ger waves. The findings show a clear difference. Private firms buy and sell assets at 
much lower intensity than public ones. The likeliness for public firms to buy or sell as-
sets over the wave years doubles, whereas transactions of private firms are much more 
saddle during these times. Maksimovic et al. (2013) suggest that in large extent public 
firms mostly drive M&A waves. This statement appears to be true even when firm size 
and productivity is taken into consideration. (Maksimovic et al. 2013: 2177-2178) 
 
There is also a link between productivity and acquisitions. Valuation and efficiency 
both have an impact in the making of acquisition decisions. It is more likely that firms 





Also the relationship between productivity and acquisitions seems to be stronger for 
public firms compared to private firms. Stock market condition influence more on listed 
firms than in private ones. Misevaluation (or unexplained valuation) of an acquiring 
firm might trigger the “need for” asset shopping. (Maksimovic et al. 2013: 2178.) 
 
Additional reason why private firms are less active in acquisitions is that credit spreads 
do not have as big of an impact in unlisted firms. While productivity plays a vital role, 
the financing constraints might be too strong for unlisted firms to break even in a time 
of high liquidity. Furthermore, Maksimovic et al. (2013) find that the most sensitive to 
merger waves are public firms with an easy access to debt or equity financial. On the 
other hand, public firms that have a poor credit rating act like private firms.  In addition, 
results shows that the difference in acquisition activity between public and private firms 
is not simply caused by public firms superior access to financial markets. Both during 
and off the wave acquisitions are found to improve efficiency of the acquiring firm. It 
even seems that productivity increases are stronger for on-the-wave mergers. (Maksi-
movic et al. 2013: 2178- 2179, 2215.) 
 
Similarly to Rhodes-Kropf and Visvanathan (2004), Maksimovic et al. (2013) results 
show that firms with high (unexplained) valuation compared to their current fundamen-
tals are more willing to buy assets. To conclude this, it is stated that firms cannot seem 
to differ overvalued stock from high productivity of their peer firms and therefore high 
valuations make acquisitions bloom, even though the price might be wrong. (Rhodes-
Kropf et al. 2004; Maksimovic et al. 2013: 2179- 2180.) 
 
Given that high stock market valuation has been show to correlate with high merger 
activity it is crucial to understand the stock market valuation in order to shed light on 
merger activities and acquirer performance during blooming financial markets. The 
question here is that are acquisitions and acquisition returns driven by market misevalu-
ation. Petmezas et al. (2008) paper focuses on investor sentiment (optimism) during hot 
markets and they find that investors’ optimistic beliefs are a significant factor of acqui-
sition returns. If the financial markets are bullish the market participants may be over 
optimistic about the possible synergy gains and they may bid up the stock of the merg-
ing firms. (Petmezas et al. 2008: 55.) 
 
The key factor for public firms dominating merges waves may not only rise from coex-
istence of efficiency and valuation. Firms that originally have high expectations of their 





part in acquisitions when the opportunity presents itself. To conclude, productiveness of 
the firm is positively correlated with the decision to go public. Furthermore, the public 
status drives later participation in the corporate asset market. Thus, it is noted that prior 
listing characteristics of the firm set platform to the firm financing policies in the future. 











In this chapter a detailed description about the data of this study and how it is gathered 
will be presented. Furthermore, a specific description of the sample selection is provid-
ed. The takeover data is gathered from a platform provided by University of Vaasa. The 
takeover data covers over three thousand Nordic takeover deals that have taken place 
between years 2005 and 2015 providing specified information about each deal. This 
information includes: announcement days, value of transactions, percentage of shares 
acquired, percentage owned after the deal, target’s nation, acquirer’s nation, target in-
dustry, acquirer’s industry and type of payment (cash/ stock /mix) of the transactions.  
 
To carry out the event study a measurement of acquirer performance is required. A 
stock price movement of each acquirer firm is used to evaluate the impact of the takeo-
ver transaction. The stock price data for each firm is gathered using Yahoo Finance and 
Bloomberg. The market performance is measured with OMX Nordic 40 index which is 
provided by NASDAQ.   
 
5.2. Methods of collecting  
 
The initial sample consist of 3,061 Nordic based takeover deals from January 2000 to 
December 2015. All of these takeovers take place in Finland, Sweden, Norway, Den-
mark or Iceland. Both domestic and cross-border deals are taken into consideration. 
Only two transactions from Iceland survived the sample screening. Only deals with 
available deal values are included. This immediately excludes over half of the deals 
from the initial sample, leaving us with 1,212 deals. The deal values are expressed in 
domestic currencies (EUR, NOK, SEK, DKK) and US dollars (USD). Furthermore, to 
screen the sample the following criteria’s are used: 
 
1. Deal value is known 
2. Only deals with completed deal status  
3. Only deals where the acquirer is a listed company.  





5. Only deals based in Nordics are taken into consideration. Nordic countries in-
clude Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.  
6. Deal value is more than 2 million dollars.   
7. The announcement day of the deal took place between 1th of January 2000 and 
31th of December 2015.  
8. Clustered takeovers are excluded 
9. Deals where the targets or acquirers macro industry is financial are excluded.  
10. The takeover is financed with CASH only, STOCK only, or with a MIX of cash 
and stock.  
 
 
Only a fraction of all M&A deals ever gets completed as most fall through in the nego-
tiations as the deal counterparties do not reach terms that both can agree on. Similar to 
Chang (1998) and Fuller et al. (2002) this study only considers takeovers that are classi-
fied as completed. This eliminates almost thousand deals from our sample and leaves us 
with 2,190 deals.  
 
The daily stock price of the acquirer needs to available around the announcement and 
from the observation period. At least one of the deal participants (in this case the ac-
quirer) has to be a publicly traded company on a Nordic stock exchange. This obviously 
excludes the private acquirers from the deal. As later presented, the stock price changes 
are used to define the cumulative abnormal returns, which are in the center of this event 
study.  
 
For the target to be a significant addition for the firm, the acquirer needs to buy a large 
enough part of the target firm. Hence, ownership of the target has to increase at least 
with 50%. In other words, this means that at least half of the target is acquired. 597 
firms from the initial sample meet this criterion. Small value deals are excluded from 
the sample, to monitor the size factor. Also it can be assumed that deals with such small 
value can only cause minor market reactions to the acquirers share price. 
 
Also firms that previously owned a part of the target firm are not eliminated from the 
sample. The possible earlier transactions have already signaled information about the 
value of the transactions to the market. It is good to note that the wealth effect in the 
market may be more influenced by the success of transactions taken place earlier than 





As the focus of this study is on the Nordic takeover market, all takeovers must take 
place in geographical and cultural region in Northern Europe. These countries consist of 
Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. Both domestic and cross-border deals 
in this region are taken into consideration. The final data distributes and the size of each 
subsample based on method are presented in Table 3. As can be seen from Table 3. 
Sweden is obviously the most active country in the M&A market of the Nordic coun-
tries whereas, only two deals from Iceland survived the sample screening.  
 
In order to avoid dealing with the special regulatory environment and accounting issues 
related to financial institutions the study excludes banks, savings banks, unit trusts, mu-
tual funds and pension funds from the sample. The exclusion of firms which macro in-
dustry is financial eliminates 53 companies from the sample. The study focuses only on 
transactions classified as mergers or acquisitions of majority interest, that is, it excludes 
all the cases defined as an acquisition of assets, an acquisition of certain assets, a buy-
back, or a recapitalization.  
 
Similarly to Fuller et al. (2007) the study handles clustered takeovers with the assump-
tion that those may make the findings unbiased. Acquirers that make many acquisitions 
in short time period are left out from the sample because defining a clean period for 
these acquirers is not possible.  More specified description of the clean period is provid-
ed in section 6.3.4. To summarize, when a clean period of a takeover transaction is 
overlapping with another event it is impossible to isolate the normal performance of a 
stock. Therefore all firms that do not possess a clean period of two hundred days are 
eliminated from the sample. (Fuller et al. 2007.) 
 
Second reason why clustered takeovers must be treated with care is that firms that con-
stantly participate in takeover transactions may possess takeover motives that are differ-
ent from other acquirers. If M&A are in a core business and strategy of a firm the 
wealth effect of a takeover announcement is likely to be different because constant 
takeover announcements can be expected by the market. (Chang 1998: 775.) 
 
Also it has to be noted that there are other corporate events that may impact stock return 
calculations. When expected stock returns are calculated the ex-dates of dividends and 
other corporate events such as stock splits are treated with care to get the most reliable 
results. Information about corporate events concerning firms in the sample presented in 






To carry out the regressions on the impact of method of payment we need to able to 
classify the payment method. Few transactions of the original sample were deleted as 
the currency in use was not expressed. The initial sample had few deals where the deal 
was closed as asset swap transaction. This is a typical takeover transaction in industrial 
material companies. The dollar value of these assets was undisclosed, and therefore 
these deals were excluded from the sample. Also profit related payments were taken out 
from the sample because in this case the value of the target firm is attached to the future 
prospects of the firm and cannot be measured.  
 
5.3. The Final Sample  
 
The final sample consists of 203 observations, see Table 3. Nearly 70 percent of all 
transactions have a Swedish acquirer while the rest of the deals are equally distributed 
between Finland, Denmark and Norway. 152 of the 203 takeovers are intercountry deals 
meaning that the acquirer and the target are based in the same country, while 51 of the 
deals are classified as cross-border. A major part of the transactions is financed with 
cash, while mix payments follow with 19 %, leaving stock offers a piece of 12%. Inter-
esting statistic can be found when method of payment is compared with the two differ-
ent geographic scopes. Only three of the cross-border deals are financed using only 
common stock. 
 
Table 3.  Sample distribution by country and  by method of payment 
  
  
Country  Acquirers CASH STOCK MIX 
    No. % No. % No. % 
 Finland  39 21 53,85 7 17,95 11 28,21 
Denmark 22 20 90,91 1 4,55 1 4,55 
Norway 30 25 83,33 3 10,00 2 6,67 
Iceland 2 1 50,00 1 50,00 0 0,00 
Sweden  110 74 67,27 12 10,91 24 21,82 
              
  
Whole sample 203 141 24 38 
% 100 % 69 % 12 % 19 % 
Key: The whole sample of 203 observations firstly ranked alphabetically by country and next by 
Method of payment.   
 
 
This sample screening allows us to answer two hypotheses concerning the geographical 
distance between deal counterparties. Hypothesis H3a states that acquisitions are more 





percent of all cross-border deals are financed with common stock we verify that this 
phenomenon holds also in the Nordic takeover market. In the second hypotheses con-
cerning geographical distance between the firms focal point is on the ownership struc-
ture of the target: The hypothesis H3b states: “In cross-border acquisitions the target is 
more likely to be listed that private”. From the sample of 203 only one deal meets the 
criteria of being cross-border deal with listed target and acquirer.  
 
To polish the sample from size factors previous similar studies use a scale of three to 
five million dollars (deal value including the net depth of the target). Nordic firms tend 
to be smaller compared to US or UK pears, so only deals valuing less than two million 
USD are excluded from the sample.  597 takeover announcements meet this criterion.   
The average value of the deal including the depth of the target is listed in Table 4.   
 
Further the data is divided into sets to compare public-to-public & public- to private 
deals. Firm’s official name and Bloomberg was used to identify the ownership structure 
of the target firms. From the whole sample of 203 takeovers 11 of the target firms can 
be classified as public and 192 as private.  
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
 TARGET Deals  Total value of transactions  Average value of a deal 
  No.  million  million  
Private  192  $                           10 064,64   $                            52,42  
Public 11  $                              1 685,42   $                          153,22  
 
Whole sample 203  $                           11 749,64   $                            57,88  
 
Average closing prices in public-to-private deals in 52 million dollar equivalent figure 
for public-to-public deals is 153 million.  Comparing the deal values in different sub-
samples based on payment method it is found on average the most valuable deals are 
closed with combination of stock and cash as the average value of mixed deals is bit 
over 73 million.  In comparison, the average deal value for cash financed deals is 56mil. 
$. and 44mil. $. for deals closed with stock only.   
 
5.4. Limitation of the data 
 
The aim of a highly specified sample screening is to produce as accurate and reliable 





which can cause harm to the reliability of the findings presented later on in this study. 
For example MacKinley (2007) notes that in studies where the results are based on a 
limited amount of event observations, it has to be noted that the empirical result may be 
strongly influenced by few or even on one or two firms. Knowledge of this strong influ-
ence of a narrowed sample is a key when evaluating the importance of the results. Ideal-
ly the results will provide insights that help to understand the sources and causes behind 
the effects of the event under screening. When a critical analysis and competing expla-
nation are added the study becomes less biased. (MacKinlay 2007: 15).  
 
Also, the event study methodology requires a use of daily data, which includes many 
potentially difficult issues. When an individual security´s daily stock data is viewed its 
movements may contain considerable differences from normality that are non-existent 
when monthly data is observed. The evidence is based on a suggestion that assumes 
daily stock returns to be fat-tailed compared to normal distribution. The same problem 
exists in the case of daily excess returns as the excess returns are the cross-sectional 
sample mean. (Fama 1976: 21.) 
 
To diminish the problem linked to the use of daily stock price data Brown and Warner 
offer The Central Limit Theorem. This theory states that if the securities in the cross-
section are independent and identically distributed description of limited variance dis-
tribution and the distributions of the sample mean excess return will convert to normali-
ty when the number of securities in the data increases. The concern here is the sample 
size and figuring out if the amount of observations is great enough to capture the evi-
dence of excess return and its true level.  (Brown and Warner 1984.) 
 
The nature of Nordic firms brings additional problems to the sample screening. As these 
companies are quite often small compared to US and UK peers, the volume, which 
these equities are traded is substantially small. Some of these stocks do not get traded 
daily, meaning that they do not have a viewable daily price data. So even though these 
stocks are publicly traded some of them are highly illiquid. This makes it impossible to 
detect normal distribution of the stock price movements and we are not able to detect 









6. RESEARCH METHODS  
 
6.1. Event Study Methodology 
 
Event study methodology’s universal applicability has led to it is general and wide use 
in financial studies. The history of event studies goes back to the thirties, when Doley 
(1993) examined nominal price effects of stock splits. Since this pioneering study, mod-
ifications have been offered to overcome violations of the statistical assumptions used 
in early studies to generate more specific answers to more complex hypothesis. The 
framework that is most commonly in use today/nowdays is offered in two papers by 
Brown and Warner published in 1980 and 1985. This approach is also used in this 
study. (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 1997; Brown and Warner 1985). 
 
Event study is a typical method used to evaluate effects of an economic event, such as 
an earnings announcement or a merger. Examining financial market data such as stock 
price changes around the announcement day, the event study measures the impact of the 
announcement (or some other specific event) on the value of a firm. One underlying 
assumption is that if the marketplace is rational, the effects of the event should be re-
flected immediately to security prices in unbiased and efficient manner. (MacKinlay 
1997:13). 
 
The core of this study is to do a straightforward event study on acquirer returns and to 
test research hypotheses presented in section 2.2.  The event study enables the examina-
tion of the behaviour of firms´ stock prices around the corporate event. First the acquirer 
returns from public-to-public and public-to-private deals are measured and further com-
pared to each other to evaluate if there is abnormal returns for acquiring private targets. 
Further the impact of the method of financing is evaluated in both groups to solve if 
target´s ownership structure (private or public) and a specific choice of method of pay-
ment generate abnormal returns for the acquirer. (Kothari and Warner 2006: 4). 
 
Moreover, a measurement of normal returns is required. These normal returns can also 
be named as expected returns. These are the returns that would occur if the event, in this 
case the takeover, would not happen. The expected returns are denoted for each day (t) 





proaches available to calculate the normal returns of a stock. These approaches can be 
roughly divided in two categories. First, statistical models follow statistical assumptions 
when it comes to the behaviour of the asset returns under the expectation that that these 
returns are not dependent on any economic factors. The second group – economic mod-
els recall assumptions such as behaviour of the investors, and these models are not sole-
ly based on statistical data. However, it should be noted that in practise the use of eco-
nomic models require additional statistical assumptions. The economic models needed 
for statistical assumption are rather tools to gather more precise measures of normal 




The dependent variable in this study is the acquirer´s abnormal returns. An event study 
methodology is used to estimate abnormal returns for the acquirer. The standard ap-
proach provided by McWillimas and Siegel (1997) is used to calculate the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR). The announcement date information is available in the origi-
nal data. (McWillimas et al. 1997: 628- 629). 
 
Following the guidelines of Capron et al. (2007) independent variables of the acquirer 
return model are created. First independent variable of this study is the ownership struc-
ture of the target. Two subsamples are created as follows: private ownership is consid-
ered to be equal to one (1) if the target firm is privately held and otherwise zero (0) 
meaning that the target is a listed firm.  
 
Second group of binary variables includes the payment method of the deal. All deals are 
classified into categories that contain only cash (CASH), only stocks (STOCK), or a 
mixture of cash and stocks (MIXED). Finally the geographic distance between the deal 
counterparties are divided in two subsamples where cross-border deals are considered to 
be equal to one (1) and otherwise zero (0) meaning that both the acquirer and the target 
are based in the same country. (Faccio and Masoulis 1939). 
 
6.3. Approach and model 
 
Econometrics textbook by Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) outline the structure of 
an event study. This approach is applied in this study. First, the event window is de-





impact on the security prices. In this case the actual event is the announcement day of 
the takeover deal. In practise the event window is stretched out to three or two days. The 
event window includes the day prior the event and also the day after the event in order 
to capture the price effects that arise from the announcement which occur after the stock 
market closes on the event day. (MacKinlay et al. 1997: 150- 152). 
 
 Similar to Andrade et al. (2001), a three day event window is used in this study. Such a 
short event window excludes noise from the data such as another events and ensures 
more punctual results. The event day, day 0 is the announcement day and day prior (-1) 
and day after (+1) are included to the event window. Announcement dates of the takeo-
vers deals are provided in the initial data. (Anderade 2001). 
 
In addition, an estimation period (also known as the clean period) is needed in order to 
be able to compare the possible price effects arising from the takeover announcement. 
Normally the event window itself is excluded from the estimation period to block the 
event from impacting the parameter used to calculate the normal performance of the 
security under surveillance. (Chang 1998.) 
 
 Similarly to Chang (1998) an estimation period of 200 days is chosen to measure the 
average normal daily return of acquiring firms stock. To eliminate the event from the 
estimation window, the estimation period is started eleven days prior the event (T1), 
where t = 0 is the announcement day, and stretched out to 210 days (T0) prior the event 
day (see Figure .1 for the timeline of the study).  
 








To capture the events’ impact a measure of abnormal returns is required. The abnormal 
return is calculated by viewing the actual ex post returns of the share during the event 
window and eliminating the normal return of the stock over the event window. Normal 
return can be defined as the return the firm would have had if the event would have not 
taken place. Simplified, the abnormal return is the actual return (event included) minus 
estimation  event  post-event 
window window window 
            
 
        
 
 





the normal expected return (event excluded). For each firm i and event date t it can be 
denoted as      
   
 	
 =   	
 − 	
 |  ,                       (3) 
 
where 	
  is the abnormal return. Abnormal return can be used as a straightforward 
measurement of the unanticipated change in shareholders wealth associated to the take-
over announcement. 	
 is the actual, and 	
  is the normal return, in respect to time 
period t.   is the information adapted to the normal performance model.  (MacKinlay 
et al. 2007: 150-152; Kohtari and Warner 2006: 9-10).  
 
Before abnormal returns can be defined a model for normal returns is required. There 
are different ways to model normal returns i.e. expected returns. First, there are models 
that assume the expected returns to be unconditional on the event but dependent on oth-
er information. Whereas in other models like the Market Model, the , represents the 
market return. A stable linear relation between the given security return and the market 
return is expected in this model. (Kohtari et al. 2006; MacKinlay et al. 1997: 150- 152). 
 
In this study, three different models are chosen to evaluate the expected return of the 
stock. This way the findings on abnormal returns can be considered as unbiased as pos-
sible if all the models signal similar findings. These models differ from one another 
from the perspective of information that is adapted to the calculation of normal perfor-
mance of the security. In The Constant Mean Return Model the  is constant and this 
model assumes that the return of a specific security is constant over time. The Market 
Adjusted Return Method on the other hand relies on market efficiency when defining the 
normal return. Finally, the most sophisticated model, The Market Model adapts infor-
mation about both the performance of the individual security and the market. (MacKin-
lay et al. 1997). 
 
6.3.1. The Constant Mean Adjusted Return Model 
 
The Constant Mean Adjusted Return model, also known as the mean adjusted returns 
model, focuses on each security’s return around the announcement date i.e. the event 
window. The goal is to examine if the returns on the individual stock are statistically 





estimation period. T-test is used evaluate the significance of the results. (Brown And 
Warner 1980: 213).  
 
To observe the excess return the study uses arithmetic return Ri,t for security i at time t. 
Ai,t is defined as the excess return for the stock i at time t. For every stock, the excess 




, − 	,    (4) 
 
where 	 is simply the average of security´s (i) daily return. Like in the study by Chang 
(1998), the clean period starts from t = -210 and continues to ten days prior the event t = 
-11. It can be denoted as  
 
	
  =    ∑ 	


    (5) 
  
This model only employs data about the given security and do not take market changes 
into consideration. In the mean adjusted method the abnormal performance for a given 
stock in the event related period is simply the difference between its realized return on 
the each day of the period compared to the average mean return of the same security 
under the clean period. This difference in returns (	
, − 	 , ) is standardized by the 
estimated standard deviation of the returns in the clean period. (Ahern 2006: 6; Brown 
& Warner 1980: 252).  
 
For security i, the mean 	, and the standard deviation  (	) of the securities return in 
the clean period are estimated as:  
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From here we can denote that the excess standardized mean return for the security aris-













6.3.2. The Market Adjusted Return Method 
  
In this model it is assumed that previous (ex ante) expected returns are the same across 
securities, but not certainly constant for a given security. Here a market index is used to 
predict the returns for every asset. Simply, the model assumes that the predicted return 
of  each firm’s security (i) for each day (t) is the same as the market return for that day:  
 
	#
, = 	$,,    (8) 
 
This means that the ex post abnormal return on any asset (i) is the difference between its 
actual return and its market portfolio return: 
 

, =  	
, − 	$, ,    (9) 
 
where 	$, is the weighted market index return. The market adjusted return method is 
consistent with Asset Pricing Model where it is assumed that all the securities in the 
sample have the same systematic risk. (Brown and Warner 1980: 208; Brown and 
Warner 1984: 7). 
 
6.3.3. The Market Model  
 
The Market Model takes into consideration the fact that firms’ security prices are sensi-
tive to both the market factors and for firm specific factors. The same clean period of 
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However, according to the rules of efficient market theory the returns cannot constantly 
differ from the predicted ones. Therefore, the expected value of the (
, that is, the com-
ponent describing unexpected movement of the security return in the regression cannot 
differ from zero. As (












 is the part of the returns that cannot be explained by the market. '
 is specific 
security´s sensitivity to the market. The marked index return for day t is referred as 	$. 
(Brown and Warner 1984).  
 
The standard market model is the most widely used method in previous studies in which 
acquirer returns are observed (see for instance Chang 1998 or Fuller et al. 2002). How-
ever, this model also involves some problems. Drapel and Padyal (2006) make a notion 
that this model does not take into consideration that the clean period may be contami-
nated as some acquirers might be involved in several deals in the sample, which can 
have an impact on the reliability of the findings. In this paper this problem is treated by 
eliminating clustered takeovers, thus this still does not close out the possibility that the 
estimation period is contaminated by other firm specific information or market infor-
mation that is not taken into consideration while modelling expected returns. 
 
6.3.4. Analysing Abnormal returns 
 
As the mean adjusted return model, the market adjusted model and market model are 
used to evaluate normal returns we also need to measure the returns of the event win-
dow to find is there is difference between these two i.e. an existence of abnormal re-
turns. (MacKinlay et al 1997: 157). 
 
By employing the three previously introduced models, the abnormal returns (AR) of the 
event window on each stock on day t can be calculated: 
 
	
, =  	
, −  	
,     (12) 
 
Here 	+ is the actual observed return for firm j on day t and 	+ is the predicted return 
for the same firm at the same time. The residual of these two is the procedure of the 
event that is the takeover announcement. For every acquirer the residual i.e. the differ-
ence between 	+ and 	+ is summed for the whole event window, in this case for three-
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After the cumulative abnormal return for each acquirer’s stock in the sample is calculat-
ed these CARs are summed and divided to get the average CAR of the 203 firms in the 
sample: 
  
,	  =   ∑ ./01,2    (13) 
This average CAR shows the existence of abnormal returns over the whole sample in-
cluding all the deals over the time period. In addition, we create different subsamples 
including only specified deals such as only public-to-private or public to public. Fur-
thermore, we define even more specified subsamples based on the method of payment. 
In addition to average values, a median cumulative abnormal return is calculated to out-
line the most drastic findings.  
 
When a performance is evaluated with measure like CAR, a test statistic has to be com-
puted to compare the distribution of the results it is assumed to have under the null hy-
pothesis. In this case the average cumulative abnormal return is expected to be zero. The 
following test statistic is used to measure statistical significance of the average CAR 
over the three day event period:  
  
3 − 4353 ∶  ./078(./0)  =  
∑ /09 2:; 
√ 78 (/0)   (14) 
 
 
In this formula, the AR is the average abnormal return across the whole sample for each 
day t and the standard deviation of the sample’s abnormal returns =8 (	) can be classi-
fied as:  
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In the following formula 	 is simply the average abnormal return of the whole sample 
over the clean period (200 days): 
 
	 =    ∑ 	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More precisely, the null hypothesis can be rejected when the test statistic given in t- stat 





the 1% and 5% tail region, meaning that the size or test level equals to 0.01 or 0.05. A 
random variable like this is chosen for the test statistics because it can be assumed that 
the abnormal returns are measured with an error. This error is a combination of two fac-
tors. First, the realized returns by a single firm at the time of the event can be influenced 
by other unrelated factors than the event under evaluation and this component may 
cause the fact that the cross-sections do not literally average to zero. Second, uncondi-
tional expected returns of the security are not precise. (Kohtari et al. 2006: 12). 
 
This t- statistic presented in here is the most simplified way to test statistical signifi-
cance of the findings, in this case the statistical significance of the fact that abnormal 
returns vary from zero over the event period. If the ARs and the CARs over the event 
period are found to significantly different from the estimation period the null hypothesis 
will be rejected. (Kohtari and Warner 2006). 
 
As the market model is bit more complex than the two other models presented some 
adjustment needs to be made to test the significance of the findings. The market model 
has a higher estimation error in the regression coefficient than the other two models. 
This is because it includes both the variation of the firm itself and the market. By stand-
ardizing the ARs and CARs found with the market model the results become more reli-
able. (Dodd and Warner 1982: 431). 
 
The ARs and further CARs of the market model have to standardized by taking a square 
root of all of the for each stock combining both the systematic and firm specific risk: 
test the normal distribution of both the market and the stock. This can be accomplished 
with following equation (Dodd and Warner 1983): 
 
=	 = /012712 =  
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   (16) 
 
Further, from here we can calculate the average standardized cumulative abnormal re-
turn:  
 
          (17) 
 
 
Following the guidelines of Dodd and Warner (1983) and assuming normal distribution 
of the findings, we can calculate the Z-Scores used to test statistical significance of the 





      
E  √203   =	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Additionally, from here we can calculate the statistical difference between two different 
cumulative abnormal returns. The Z-score of two different CARs takes the following 
form: 
 
                       (19) 
 
 
ASCAR1 and ASCAR2 are the standardized cumulative abnormal return of different 







7. EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS 
 
7.1. Bidder returns: whole sample 
 
As presented earlier, the goal of an event study is to measure the impact of an event 
relative to the value of the firm. The value of the firm is measured with firm´s market 
value and the change to this value is measured with alteration in firm’s stock price. As 
described in section 6.3. three different methods are chosen to carry out the event study 
in this paper. The acquirer announcement returns are measured with a three day event 
window (-1, +1). The event period starts eleven days (-11) prior to the announcement 
date and continues ten days (+10) after the announcement date. The estimation period 
length is 200 days, making the clean period to stretch from day -11 to day -210 relative 
to the event day zero (0).  
 
The summarized findings on announcement returns in Nordic takeover are presented in 
Table 5. In this table all of the 203 deals in the sample are first taken into consideration 
and then these results are divided into subsamples according to the method of payment. 
The percentages are cumulative abnormal returns over a three day window calculated 
with three different methods presented in the previous chapter.  
 
Table  5.   Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns – All Deals  
MODEL  ALL  METHOD OF PAYMENT  
 
  CASH STOCK MIX 
The Market Model  1,99 % 0,84 % 1.02% 2,87 % 
Z - Score 0,81 0.61 0,23 1,1 
Market Adjusted Return  1,58 % 0,97 % -2,54 % 2,56 % 
T - Test 1,29 1,17 1,85* 2,10** 
The Mean Adjusted return  1,89 % 0,85 % 1,08 % 2,42 % 
T - Test 0,72 0,56 0,23 0,89 
No. of deals 203 141 24 38 
% 100 % 69 % 12 % 19 % 
Key: Positive one-tailed test is used to evaluate the significance levels of the findings *, ** and ***, 
indicate significant CAR at the 10 percent level, 5 percent level and 1 percent level, respectively 
 
Table 5. also presents the significance levels of the findings. For the market model the 
z-statistics are used as a describer in chapter 6.3.4. As for the two other models a stand-





are from the mean. As can be seen, only the findings based on the market adjusted re-
turn are significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. However, when these re-
sults on announcements returns are later divided into more specified subsamples the 
statistical significance of the CARs calculated with all different methods increases. 
Moreover, although the announcement returns of the acquirer are found to be insignifi-
cant in many cases there appears to be a statistically significant difference between the 
CARs of different subsamples consisting categorically different types of deals from one 
another. This will be demonstrated further on.  
 
The results shown in Table 5. implicate that overall acquisitions are a positive net pre-
sent investment for the acquirer. Even so, these positive CARs are mainly insignificant 
so the abnormal acquirer returns do not statistically differ from zero. Thus, it can be 
noted that at least the average findings for the whole sample do not reveal any infor-
mation about the destruction of value for the acquirer. Surprisingly the most positive 
acquirer returns are found in deals which use a mix of cash and stock as a method of 
payment.  
 
















Key: AR represent the daily abnormal return of the acquirer starting from day -10 to day +10 relative to 
the event.   
 
Figure 2 shows the average ARs around the takeover announcement. The deals are di-
vided in three categories according to the method of payment. From this graphic display 





stock as method of payment. Then again it can be seen that in all three subsamples the 
average stock prices of the acquirer stars cumulating abnormal returns a day before (-1) 
to the announcement. As the deal should not be public information until the day zero 
that is the announcement this could be sign of information leakage. (Chang, Shekhar, 
Tam & Yao 2016.) 
 
Looking at the Table 5 the only value that is not in line with the corresponding figures is 
the subsample STOCK cumulative abnormal return based on the market adjusted mod-
el. This model is clearly the most simple from the three models. However, it is also the 
most unstable as it does not reflect the overall market performance or the historical per-
formance of a individual stock. The market adjusted model is sensitive to market fluctu-
ations as it merely expects the expected (normal) return of the stock to be equal to the 
market performance on that day. This could partly explain why it signals negative -2.54 
% CAR for stock offers. We do not completely ignore this as the figure is significant at 
10% level. However, in this study we weight the figures calculated with the market 
model as it uses both the market returns and individual performance to capture the true 
level of expected (normal) returns. (Brown and Warner 1985.) 
 











Key: Line AR1 is return based on The Constant Mean model, AR 2 return is the Market Adjusted return 
and AR 3 uses The Market Model to calculate expected returns.  
 
 
The empirical evidence on cumulative abnormal returns for the whole sample range 
from positive 1.58 % to positive 1.99 %  and this shows that all of the three models used 
to define expected returns and further abnormal returns provide relatively similar re-
sults. Figure 3. shows the average abnormal returns from 10 days prior the announce-





highlights the effect that the announcement has on acquirer’s stock price. We can clear-
ly see from here that the results are not dependent on the methods by which the ex-
pected returns are defined as all three models in use signal similar outcomes. Figure 3 
proves that all three models signal highly similar result no matter how the expected re-
turns of the stock are defined. Later the findings presented in this study are mainly 
based to the market model.  
 
Table 6. Average Market model ARs and CARs with 21- day event window 
DAY 
(t) 

























-10 -0,02 -0,02 -0,01 0,14 0,14 0,10 -0,33 -0,33 -0,15 -0,57 -0,57 -0,28 
-9 0,14 0,12 0,07 -0,12 0,03 0,02 1,62 1,30 0,58 0,64 0,07 0,04 
-8 0,18 0,30 0,16 0,05 0,08 0,05 1,53 2,82 1,27 0,03 0,10 0,05 
-7 0,09 0,40 0,21 0,15 0,23 0,16 0,23 3,05 1,37 -0,54 -0,43 -0,21 
-6 -0,07 0,33 0,18 -0,05 0,18 0,13 0,33 3,38 1,52 -0,08 -0,51 -0,25 
-5 -0,02 0,31 0,17 0,06 0,24 0,17 -1,16 2,22 1,00 -0,20 -0,71 -0,35 
-4 -0,09 0,22 0,12 -0,10 0,14 0,10 -0,31 1,91 0,86 0,03 -0,67 -0,33 
-3 -0,05 0,17 0,09 -0,20 -0,06 -0,04 -0,59 1,31 0,59 0,60 -0,08 -0,04 
-2 -0,03 0,14 0,07 0,03 -0,02 -0,02 -0,04 1,28 0,57 -0,53 -0,60 -0,30 
-1 0,14 0,28 0,15 0,23 0,20 0,14 -2,03 -0,75 -0,34 0,25 -0,35 -0,17 
0 1,58 1,86 1,00 0,65 0,85 0,59 1,65 0,90 0,40 3,20 2,85 1,41 
1 0,13 1,99 1,07 0,02 0,87 0,61 0,12 1,02 0,46 0,03 2,87 1,42 
2 0,01 2,00 1,07 -0,13 0,75 0,52 0,18 1,20 0,54 0,66 3,53 1,75 
3 -0,21 1,79 0,96 0,07 0,82 0,57 -1,16 0,04 0,02 -0,69 2,84 1,40 
4 -0,09 1,70 0,91 -0,10 0,72 0,50 0,38 0,42 0,19 -0,43 2,41 1,19 
5 0,05 1,75 0,94 0,02 0,74 0,51 1,02 1,43 0,65 -0,21 2,20 1,09 
6 -0,14 1,60 0,86 -0,17 0,57 0,40 0,25 1,68 0,76 0,06 2,26 1,12 
7 0,00 1,60 0,86 0,13 0,70 0,48 0,17 1,85 0,83 -0,77 1,49 0,74 
8 0,17 1,77 0,95 0,06 0,76 0,53 0,12 1,97 0,89 0,37 1,87 0,92 
9 -0,35 1,42 0,76 -0,17 0,60 0,41 -0,08 1,90 0,85 -0,93 0,94 0,46 
10 0,18 1,60 0,86 0,12 0,71 0,49 -0,17 1,72 0,78 0,06 1,00 0,49 
Key: Z- scores presented test the statistical significance of cumulative abnormal returns 
 
As expressed earlier the 3-day event window is the most commonly used in event stud-
ies measuring abnormal acquirer returns. 3- day event window is also the primary event 





(2004) make a use of a longer window beginning several days before the announcement 
and ending when the merger is closed. Likewise to these studies we provide daily ab-
normal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) covering ten days be-
fore and after the announcement (-10, +10). The first column of Table 6. covers the 
whole sample of 203 Nordic takeover deals in the. The other columns of table 6. repre-
sent the ARs and CAS based on subsamples arranged by the method of payment.   
 
It was also stated earlier that the 3-day event window is the most informative as it relies 
on the efficient market theory and expect the market to react quickly to new infor-
mation. Table 6 confirms this statement as it is easy to detect from here that the effect of 
the takeover announcement is quickly adapted to market prices. The use of a longer 
window does not provide us new information about the acquirer performance around 
the announcement of the takeover. (Anderade 2004.) 
 
7.2. Bidder returns: private targets  
 
Table 7 presents the results of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for firms taking 
over private targets. 192 takeovers transactions from our sample are classified as those 
where the target is an unlisted firm. The empirical findings in Table 9 provide evidence 
that average private target acquisitions have a positive net present value as an invest-
ment .The acquirer CARs for the all 192 private target deals show a positive average 
return from 1.25 % to 1.67 % depending on the model in use.  
 
TABLE 7:  Avarage Cumulative Abnormal Returns - Public to Private Deals 
MODEL  ALL  METHOD OF PAYMENT  
  
CASH STOCK MIX 
The Market Model Return 1,67 % 0,81 % -0,30 % 2,49 % 
Z - Score 0,90 0,52 0,13 1,28 
Market Adjusted Return 1,25 % 0,90 % -3,67 % 2,21 % 
T - Test 1,07 1,09 2,84** 1,94* 
The Mean Adjusted return 1,55 % 0,78 % -0,28 % 2,03 % 
T - Test 0,05 0,52 0,06 0,78 
No. of deals 192 134 22 36 
% 100 % 70 % 11 % 19 % 
Key: *, ** and ***, indicate significant CAR at the 10 percent level, 5 percent level and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
CARs of public-to-private deals are divided into three subsamples based on whether the 





evidence that the CARs of acquirers using mix financing are the highest. The negative 
cumulative abnormal returns for cash financed signal that these deals on average are not 
positive investment. Moreover cash financed transactions destroy acquirers’ shareholder 
value.   
 
None of the CARs for the private target acquirers based on the Market model are statis-
tically significant. But when we move on comparing CARs in the different subsamples 
we can denote that the difference in these CARs is statically significant. For example 
comparing the positive average CAR of 0.81% found on cash deals and the negative 
CAR of 0,3  % in stock financed deal the z-score of these two figures is 2,79. This is a 
strong evidence that the choice of method of payment has an impact acquirer returns in 
the Nordic takeover market. Similarly to findings associated to the whole sample also 
the subsample of private target takeovers show evidence on superior performance for 
acquirer firms using combination of stock and cash as a method of payment.  
 
7.3. Bidder returns: public targets 
 
As 95 percent of the deals in our data are private targets the subsample of public-to.-
public deals is notably small. Even though the sample size is small the performance of 
these investments is remarkable: looking at individual deals only one deal from the 
eleven deals was unsuccessful when simply measured with stock performance of the 
acquirer.  
 
Table 8:  Avarage Cumulative Abnormal Returns - Public to Public Deals 
MODEL  ALL  METHOD OF PAYMENT  
  
CASH STOCK MIX 
The Market Model Return 6,06 % 2,92 % 15,80 % 7,34 % 
Z - Score 2,86*** 1,45 10,84*** 3,77*** 
Market Adjusted Return 6,29 % 7,16 % 13,66 % 6,57 % 
T - Test 5,79*** 6,99*** 14,81*** 4,47*** 
The Mean Adjusted return 6,28 % 6,80 % 16,20 % 7,24 % 
T - Test 2,90*** 2,82*** 10,83*** 3,69*** 
No. of deals 11 7 2 2 
% 100 % 64 % 18 % 18 % 






The findings presented in table 8 show that he market reacted favorable to public-to-
public deals on average favorable in all three sub samples. Nearly all of the cumulative 
abnormal acquirer returns are statistically significant at 1% level.  
 
Table 9. The Market Model Return on a 10- day event window  
Panel A: Average cumulative abnormal bidder returns in public-to-public dealls 
  


























5 0,74 0,38 0,03 1,41 1,77 0,02 4,65 3,19 0,80 0,34 2,82 1,19 
4 0,14 0,07 0,03 1,48 -0,97 -0,06 3,68 2,52 -0,53 -0,22 2,29 0,97 
3 -0,08 -0,04 0,03 1,44 -0,65 0,03 3,02 2,08 -0,26 -0,11 2,03 0,86 
2 -0,85 -0,44 0,02 1,01 0,48 0,02 3,51 2,41 -0,38 -0,16 1,64 0,70 
1 -0,14 -0,07 0,02 0,93 2,22 -0,08 5,73 3,93 0,02 0,01 1,66 0,71 
0 3,33 1,71 0,05 2,65 12,1 1,05 17,90 12,29 1,09 0,46 2,75 1,17 
1 2,19 1,13 0,07 3,77 -2,11 0,00 15,80 10,84 0,16 0,07 2,92 1,24 
2 -0,27 -0,14 0,07 3,63 3,09 0,14 18,88 12,96 -0,09 -0,04 2,83 1,20 
3 -0,72 -0,37 0,06 3,26 1,57 0,01 20,46 14,04 0,95 0,40 3,77 1,60 
4 1,37 0,71 0,08 3,97 -0,14 0,00 20,31 13,94 0,22 0,09 3,99 1,69 
5 0,03 0,01 0,08 3,99 -0,20 -0,02 20,11 13,81 0,46 0,20 4,45 1,89 
Panel B: Average cumulative abnormal bidder returns in public-to-private deals 
  


























5 -0,24 -0,09 -0,85 -0,34 -1,31 0,02 1,83 0,41 0,04 0,02 0,16 0,11 
4 0,02 0,01 -0,83 -0,33 -0,23 -0,06 1,60 0,36 -0,08 -0,05 0,09 0,06 
3 0,60 0,24 -0,23 -0,09 -0,54 0,03 1,06 0,24 -0,19 -0,14 -0,11 -0,07 
2 -0,48 -0,19 -0,71 -0,28 -0,08 0,02 0,98 0,22 0,05 0,03 -0,06 -0,04 
1 0,26 0,10 -0,45 -0,18 -2,21 -0,08 -1,23 -0,28 0,21 0,15 0,15 0,11 
0 3,02 1,21 2,58 1,03 0,63 1,05 -0,60 -0,13 0,62 0,44 0,78 0,54 
1 -0,09 -0,04 2,49 0,99 0,30 0,00 -0,30 -0,07 0,03 0,02 0,81 0,56 
2 0,67 0,27 3,16 1,26 -0,08 0,14 -0,37 -0,08 -0,15 -0,10 0,66 0,46 
3 -0,66 -0,26 2,50 1,00 -1,29 0,01 -1,67 -0,37 0,07 0,05 0,73 0,51 
4 -0,50 -0,20 2,00 0,80 0,39 0,00 -1,28 -0,29 -0,11 -0,08 0,62 0,43 
5 -0,21 -0,08 1,79 0,72 1,03 -0,02 -0,24 -0,05 0,01 0,01 0,63 0,44 
 
In table 9 the ARs and CARs of puplic-to-public and public-to-private deals are pre-
sented together. The results presented in table 9. are based on the market model. An 
eleven day (-5,+5) event  window is chosen to truly capture the differences in wealth 
effects of the two subsamples.  
The graphic displays in Figures 4 and 5 show the abnormal acquirer returns of the two 





are easy to detect from here. Ignoring the magnitude of these ARs (and further CARs) 
the findings show that for public target acquirers the stock financing is evidently the 
most favorable alternative as no remarkable returns are reported for cash deals.  Where-
as, for the private target acquirers more positive abnormal returns are found on mix and 
cash deals as the stock financed deals seem to have negative wealth effect for the ac-
quirer.  
 
Figure 4. The Market Model ARs for public-to-public takeovers on a 10- day event 
window 
Key: All average ARs in figure 4 scale from positive 17.9% to negative 2.21% 
 
Figure 5. The Market Model ARs for public-to-public takeovers on a 10- day event 


















8. FINDINGS & DICUSSION  
 
8.1. Expected results 
 
Previous results from the UK and US market show fundamental differences in acquirer 
returns when comparing public-target and private-target acquisitions. Especially, the 
bidder return gains from private target deals well exceed the bidder returns gained from 
acquiring listed targets. (Koherns 2004: 1164.)  
 
Empirical findings from the US, UK and continental European takeover market (see for 
instance: Koherns 2004; Anderade et al. 2001; Capron et al. 2007) mainly reach the 
same conclusion when combining the target selection (public or private) and the method 
of payment of the transaction (cash, stock, or mix) as a source of abnormal acquirer 
performance. These findings can be summarized as follows: (1) for the acquirers of pri-
vate targets stock financing is found to be a more favorable option and cash financing is 
found to gain cumulate negative returns, (2) for the acquirers of public targets cash fi-
nancing earns more positive cumulative returns while the stock financing is a less fa-
vorable option.  
 
8.2. Actual findings 
 
In Chapter 2.2. various hypotheses concerning the acquiring performance were present-
ed. These hypotheses were chosen based on the phenomenon detected in earlier US and 
UK M&A research over the years. After executing empirical research with data consist-
ing of carefully selected 203 Nordic takeover deals we can show if these hypothesis 
hold in the Nordic takeover market.  
 
Findings on positive acquirer returns  
 
The main purpose of this study was to resolve if mergers and acquisition overall add 
value for the acquirer in the Nordic takeover market. The first hypothesis took form:  
 






The average net present values of all the transactions in our sample have on average 
positive ARs and CARs around the announcement day measured with all three methods 
presented. The average CAR measured with the market model compares the actual re-
turn during the event to both the expected market return and to the individual stock’s 
past performance. The market model CAR for the whole sample sets to 1.99 percent. 
Therefore, we can state that the hypothesis H1 holds. It has to be underlined that this 
does not mean that all the acquirers in our sample reached the level where their invest-
ment could be considered to have a positive net present value. Looking at all of the 203 
observations of this study there is a variation from positive 16 percent CAR to negative 
17 percent CAR for a single transaction. In order to prevent the result from being biased 
by those acquirers that performed exceptionally well or exceptionally poor the median 
results are presented in Table 10. The median results of the whole sample do not differ 
much from the average results, still these median values are slightly lower.  
 
Table 10:  Average and Median Cumulative Abnormal Returns - All Deals 
MODEL  ALL AVARAGE ALL MEDIAN  
 
 CAR CAR 
The Market Model  1,99 % 1,44 % 
Z - Score 0,81 0,77 
Market Adjusted Return  1,58 % 1,44 % 
T - Test 1,29 1,26 
The Mean Adjusted return  1,89 % 1,35 % 
T - Test 0,72 0,65 
No. of deals 203 203 
Key: *, ** and ***, indicate significant CAR at the 10 percent level, 5 percent level and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
None of these positive figures presented in Table 10. achieve a level where the results 
could be considered statistically significant. This is in line with previous findings (see 
for instance Anderade et al. 2001, Mitchell and Stafford 2000; Mulherin and Boone 
2000) that have demonstrated that mergers in general create value to the acquirer, but 
find that average ARs and CARs are close to zero or slightly positive and statistically 
insignificant.  
 
Finding on ownership structure of the target  
 







H2: Ownership structure of the target has an impact on acquirer returns 
 
The aim of hypothesis H2 was to review if there is a statistically significant difference 
found between deals where both the acquirer and the target are listed firms compared to 
those deals where the acquirer is listed, but the target is a privately held firm. In Table 
13. the whole sample is divided into two subsamples. The amount of listed targets’ ac-
quisitions is quite limited and only five percent of all the observed transactions have a 
target that can be classified as listed.  
 
The average cumulative abnormal return of those acquirers that acquire private targets 
sets around 1.82 % as the corresponding CAR of acquirers of public targets is 6.21%. 
Table 13. shows that positive CAR attached to public targets is highly significant at 
0,01 level. These findings show that the acquirer of public targets gained on average 4.5 
% higher cumulative abnormal returns than acquirers acquiring private targets.  
 
 
Table 11: Average CARs – subsamples of private and public targets 
MODEL  PRIVATE TARGET  PUBLIC TARGET 
 
CAR CAR 
The Market Model Return 1,67 % 6,06 % 
Z - Score 0,90 2,86*** 
Market Adjusted Return 1,25 % 6,29 % 
T - Test 1,07 5,79*** 
The Mean Adjusted return 1,55 % 6,28 % 
T - Test 0,05 2,90*** 
No. of deals 192 11 
% of all deals 95 % 5 % 
Key: *, ** and ***, indicate significant CAR at the 10 percent level, 5 percent level and 1 percent level, 
respectively 
 
From the empirical findings presented in Table 13 we can state that hypothesis H2 holds 
on the Nordic takeover market. Ownership structure of the target has a substantial im-
pact on the acquirer performance. Also the additional hypothesis H2a: “Abnormal ac-
quirer returns are positive when the target is private” and H2b: “Abnormal acquirer 
returns are positive when the target is public” can be confirmed as no negative returns 
can be linked to either of the subsamples.  
 
Based on the empirical findings we reject the H2c: “Acquirer returns are on average 





“Acquirer returns are on average higher in public-to-public deals than on public-to-
private deals” in the Nordic M&A climate.  
 
Also the difference between the cumulative abnormal returns of the private and public 
target acquirer returns is statistically significant. The statistical significance of the two 
CARs is calculated as presented in Chapter 6.1. Based on the market model the test sta-
tistic of private target CARs and public target CARs is 8.16, and it is highly significant 
on 0,01 level.  
 
Our findings do not support the earlier findings about the exceptionally high abnormal 
acquirer returns of the public-to-private deals found in the US, UK nor Continental Eu-
ropean M&A markets. Various explanations for the superior performance of private 
target acquirers in the US and UK are provided by earlies studies. The difference be-
tween the two subsamples (public vs. private) has been explained with factors such as 
liquidity, agency problems or lack of them, the nature of information, limited competi-
tion, publicity factors, and valuation of assets.  
 
These same theories could provide explanations why public target acquirers perform 
better in the characteristically different North European financial market.  One of the 
core differences between Nordic and global firms is the concentration of ownership. 
The Nordic countries’ ownership structure is somewhat more concentrated compared to 
global enterprises. The limited amount of owners possibly calm down the agency prob-
lems as well as limit the information asymmetries. 
 
Immonen (2014) states that especially following the latest financial crisis issues about 
the “short-termism” ownership structure of institutional shareholders have been pointed 
out. He suggests that many corporate governance models are failing due to lack of inad-
equate monitoring by the scattered shareholders. This suggests that more concentrated 
ownership could provide better corporate governance platform for publicly traded firms. 
As corporate governance impact the firm’s ability to make investment decision, theories 
of first-rate corporate governance in Nordic firms could partly explain why Nordic firms 
perform remarkably well in the M&A market.  
 
Maksimovic et al. (2013) talk about the link between productivity and acquisitions. 
Firms that originally have high expectations of their future growth and have a high 
productivity are more likely go public and then later take part in acquisitions when the 





ly be labelled as a positive factor. Productiveness of public firms may partly explain 
why buying a public target is a good investment decision.  
 
Findings on method of payment  
 
Earlier findings (for example Draper et al. 2006 and Raggozino et al. 2011) suggest that 
acquirer returns are dependent on how the takeover transaction is financed. In this study 
both univariate and multivariate regressions are completed  to test if there is difference 
to be found on the level of abnormal acquirer returns in three different subsamples clas-
sified as Cash deals, Stock deals and Mix deals.   
 
H3: Method of payment has an impact on acquisition returns 
 
When the whole sample of 203 observation is considered there is no strong evident dif-
ference between the performance of the acquirers that financed the deal with cash or 
stock. Using the market model method the cumulative abnormal returns of the whole 
sample vary from 2.87% (mix deals) to 0.84% (cash deals). Based on these statistics we 
still can´t reject hypotheses 3. As table 12. shows when the deals are divided into sub-
samples according to the target’s ownership structure we find strong evidence that the 
method of payment is a factor of the acquirer performance.  
 
Additionally, the method of payment is considered from the perspective of positive net 
present investment:  
 
H3a: Abnormal acquirer returns are positive when the deal is financed with cash  
H3b: Abnormal acquirer returns are positive when the deal is financed with stock  
H3c: Abnormal acquirer returns are positive when the deal is financed with mix pay-
ment 
 
The finding of this study show positive abnormal acquirer returns for all three types of 
deals. Table 14. shows the 3-day AR and CAR ranked by the method of payment and 
divided into subsamples according to the ownership structure of the deal.  
 
Panel A shows that for private target acquirers financing the deal with mix payment i.e.  
with combination of stock and cash is the option that achieves the highest abnormal re-
turns as the 3-day CAR sets to 2.49 percent. The least favourable option for private tar-





tical difference between these two CARs is 2.19% with a z-score of 6.32. In addition, 




Table 12: Summary findings based on the Market Model returns 
    MIX     STOCK     CASH    
  
AR %  z-score CAR % AR %  z-score CAR % AR %  z-score CAR % 
Panel A:  Average Ars and CARs in private target deal            
-1 0,26 0,10 -0,45 -2,21 -0,08 -1,23 0,21 0,15 0,15 
0 3,02 1,21 2,58 0,63 1,05 -0,60 0,62 0,44 0,78 
1 -0,09 -0,04 2,49 0,30 0,00 -0,30 0,03 0,02 0,81 
Panel B : Average ARs and CARs in public  target deal            
-1 -0,14 -0,07 0,02 2,22 -0,08 5,73 0,02 0,01 1,66 
0 3,33 1,71 0,05 12,17 1,05 17,90 1,09 0,46 2,75 
1 2,19 1,13 0,07 -2,11 0,00 15,80 0,16 0,07 2,92 
 
 
Panel C: Difference between average cumulative abnormal returns between the subsamples and statistical difference 
of the two different CAR´s 
  
MIX STOCK CASH  
  CAR1 - CAR2 z-score CAR1 - CAR2 z-score CAR1 - CAR2 z-score 
-1 0,47 4,49 6,96 12,97 1,51 2,81 
0 2,52 2,48 18,50 34,45 1,98 3,68 
1 2,41 2,350 16,09 29,97 2,11 3,92 
Key: the values in panel C are absolute differences between CARs of private target acquirers and CARs 
public targets.   
 
 
Panel B shows that public-to-public deals financed with stock have a highly positive 
return of 15.8%. However, it has to be noted that the sample size of this subsample is 
very small and there is a risk it is only a coincidence that the two deals in this subsam-
ple performed exceptionally well. As a result, we cannot reliably generalize these find-
ings.  
 
We do not completely ignore the superior performance of the stock financed public-to-
public deals as there are logical explanations offered that explain this phenomenon. All 
market fluctuations are based on new information received by the market. When the 
owners of the target are willing to accept large block of shares from the acquirer it may 





bidder firm and value it high as they are willing to receive these shares as a means of 
payment.  (Martin 1996.) 
 
Furthermore, when all of the eleven public-to-public deals are considered the level of 
CARs are still higher in all three subsamples compared to private target acquisitions. 
Panel C. shows the difference in CARs between private target and public target acquisi-
tions. The Z.-score used to test statistical significance for the difference between two 
average cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as presented in Chapter 6.3.4.  
 
From Panel C. we can infer that on average public target acquirers perform better that 
those who acquirer private firms. One explanation for this is the size factor. As the pri-
vate targets are often smaller than public ones the target is a less significant addition to 
the acquiring firm and as a result the market does not react as strongly to the takeover 
announcement (Koherns 2004). 
 
Other factors explaining high cumulative abnormal returns for public targets acquirers 
compared to private targets are differences in valuations of assets, information availa-
bility and differences in the negotiation process. All these factors and theories related to 
them are presented in Chapter 3.1.1. 
 
Findings supporting the block holder hypothesis 
 
According to Chang (1998) and others following, the superior performance of private 
firm acquisitions financed with stock can be explained with enhanced monitoring pow-
er. When the deal is financed with common stock the sell side might become a large 
blockholder of the combined entity, in other words the ownership becomes more con-
centrated. Hence, the blockholders may monitor the management more closely and add 
value to the combined entity. 
 
H4: acquirers of private target´s gain more when the deal is closed with common stock   
 
We can reject the hypotheses 4 in this form as evidently more profitable private target 
takeovers are closed with cash. Even higher positive returns are accomplished with 
deals that are closed with mix payment. This indicates that using a combination of 
common stock and cash may launch a more favourable market reaction. It diminishes 
the risk that market would react unfavourably to acquirer sides’ willingness to hand out 





finds their stock overvalued. This way when the stock is combined with cash this unfa-
vourable signalling theory diminishes.  
 
One explanation for the poor performance of cash financed deals can be that these are 
one-shot type of transactions meaning that the target is out of the picture after the deal is 
closed. This may cause a problem of asymmetric information as the target side is likely 
to withhold information. This problem can be diminished by using stock as additional 
currency, since this means the target will become owner of the combine entity. (Rag-
gozino et al. 2011). 
 
Even though the findings of this study are in contrast to previous findings on the same 
theories presented in earlier studies, these findings can be used to explain why deals in 
specified subsamples perform better than others. The Nordic firms have a high level of 
concentrated ownership structure regardless of whether the firm is private or public. 
This means that the blockholder hypothesis is supported even in cases where the target 
is listed.  The magnitude of blockholders creation may even be stronger in cases where a 
listed target has a limited amount of owners as the value of these public deals if often 
greater compared to private target transactions.  
 
 
8.3. Reliability of the findings 
 
The conventional event study method presented by Brown and Warner (1985) requires a 
long estimation period that is free from the event under scrutiny. In other words the def-
inition of normal or standard returns have to be defined before it is possible to know 
what can be considered as abnormal. Defining the normal level of returns is a complex 
process as stock prices are rarely normally distributed. To make the findings as reliable 
as possible this study uses three different methods to define expected returns as well as 
ARs and CARs.  
 
Although the average findings of the whole sample are not statistically significant when 
the constant mean model or the market adjusted model are used these models offer us 
valuable insight. The findings of these two models are in line with the significant results 
measured with the market model making them more reliable.  
 
When considering the findings’ reliability the sample size has a crucial role. As noted 





samples. There was only 11 public-to-public deals that took place in the Nordic takeo-
ver market in last decade that also met the criteria for the sample screening of this study. 
To expand the amount of observations a longer timeline could be applied. As the finan-
cial market cannot be considered to remain the same over decades expanding the time-
line is not often endorsed. Other option is to loosen the sample screening. As described 
in Chapter 5.3. every restriction applied for the initial sample is justified. Additionally, 
most of the limitations in sample screening are based on limitations in data availability.  
 
 
8.4. Suggestion for further research 
 
The focus of this study is in short-term acquirer performance, whereas we completely 
ignore the long term wealth effect of the takeover transaction. In their UK based study 
Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) state that even though unlisted-target acquirers seem to 
achieve abnormal profits after the announcement day, the long run results indicate 
something else. They even suggest that acquisitions of unlisted targets cause substantial 
losses in the end, whereas the long term performance of listed target acquirers are more 
positive in the UK.  Hence, a suggestion for future research is to measure the long term 
performance of the Nordic acquirers as not a single study on the subject was found. 
 
Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) also claim that the gains experienced after the announcement   
are an outcome of investors’ excessive optimism which is a product of biased and lim-
ited information. To test whether these claims hold in the Nordic takeover market dif-
ferent approaches to measuring stock performance would be required. Hence, the long 
term performance of an acquisition is hard to measure, because in a longer period it is 
impossible to isolate the impact of the merger from other factors influencing firm per-
formance. For this reason long-term studies have gained some negative feedback for 
delivering results that are hard to define as statistically significant. (Anderade et al 
2009). 
 
Pre- and post-merger profitability of the acquirer is also a topic that could require more 
examination. If takeovers actually create value this should be seen in an actual opera-
tional performance of the acquiring company i.e. the wealth effect should at some point 
correspond to the cash flow of the firm. These studies commonly focus on accounting 






Two best-known studies that particularly measure operating performance of the acquir-
ers are Ravenscraft and Schener (1989) and Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992). While 
the first? study finds a positive link between mergers and productivity with their indus-
try divided data, the other comes to a conclusion that mergers destroy value on average.  
Hence, these authors reach very different conclusions about the actual acquirer gains in 
mergers. Additionally, both of these studies are based in the US and also suffer from 
data limitations. A study about operational pre- and post-merger of Nordic public-to-
public deals could provide us insight if these transactions can truly be considered as a 
profitable investment.  
 
This paper, like most studies before this, focuses on the acquisitions done by listed 
firms. However, this does not mean that unlisted firms do not participate in the takeover 
market. The reason for the lack of research is evident, and that is a lack of data availa-
bility. The performance of the private-to-private deals is difficult to measure as there is 
not stock price data that could be used to define abnormal returns. The performance of 
these transactions could be evaluated with historical accounting data. This would re-
quire a lot of hand collecting and critical evaluation of the information as the accounting 




8.5. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we examine the acquirer returns of Nordic takeovers over the years 2005 
to 2015. We present empirical evidence on abnormal returns for both public-to-public 
and public-to-private acquisitions. Furthermore, we analyze how the acquirer’s choice 
of financing method impacts the profitability of the transaction   
 
We report that acquisitions, on average are positive net present investments for acquir-
ers in the Nordic market. Later, we find strong evidence for positive abnormal returns 
for bidders that acquire public targets with stock, whereas acquirers acquiring private 
targets with shares come dangerously close to destroying their own share value in these 
transactions. For public-to-private acquirers the combination of cash and stock is clearly 
the most favorable method of payment.  
 
Our findings are in sharp contrast to previous findings (see for instance Chang 1998) 





financed with common stock and where cash is strongly found to be the best payment 
method for public-to-public acquirers. 
 
 
Table 13: Comparable findings about CARs between different markets  
  PUBLIC TARGET  PRIVATE TARGET  
  UK & US  Nordic UK & US  Nordic 
CASH positive (low) positive (low) positive (low) positive (low)  
STOCK  negative (low) positive (high)  positive  (high) negative (low)  
MIX NA positive (low) positive (low) positive (high) 
Key: the words negative and positive refers to various finding where the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) are found on average positive or negative.  
 
To clarify these opposite findings between the US and UK markets and the Nordic 
M&A market we simplified the main findings in Table 13. The most favorable option 
for each group is bolded. We can see from here that the effect of public target acquisi-
tions in the Nordics resembles earlier findings linked to public-to-private deals. 
 
Our findings show that acquirers of public targets experience abnormal and positive 
returns regardless of the payment method. Even more, abnormal positive returns are 
recorded for deals financed with common stock instead of cash, whereas for public-to-
private acquires the use of only stock is the least favorable option. 
 
As public-to-public acquirers performed better in all three subsamples based on the 
payment method our study shows no evidence on liquidity discount of private targets 
existing in the Nordic takeover market. One could make a proposition that liquidity is a 
problem concerning both the public and private firms in the Nordic market diminishing 
the impact of this factor in the Nordic market.   
 
Earlier discussion about liquidity short comes also to suggest that shareholders of public 
firms wanting to cash out always have an option to sell their stock to the market. This is 
not always the case in Nordic corporations where managerial ownership is common 
even for public firms. The selling of their own shares is often limited by firm policies 
(silent windows etc.) or even by law. Additionally, if these managers/owners start sell-
ing large blocks of their stock to the public it may signal negative information to the 





firms with concentrated managerial owners the only possible way to cash out is to sell 
their firm. However, this is all a speculation as no earlier M&A studies offering this 
theory was found. 
 
As the empirical results of this study are not in line with earlier finding it raises the 
question of why? One explanation could be the ownership structure of Nordic firms. 
Nordic firms compared to firms acting in a global financial market still have relatively 
high levels of concentrated ownership and managerial ownership. One could state that 
even Nordic public firms possess qualities that are normally associated to private target 
in bigger markets such as US, UK and continental Europe.  
 
We suggest that high performance of public-to-public acquirers may rise from ideal 
corporate governance models linked to Nordic firms. The earlier statement of Maksi-
movic et al. (2013) support this claim by stating that because of the more efficient cor-
porate governance public firms make superior acquisition decisions compared to private 
firms measured by efficiency gains. This seems to hold even though conflict of separa-
tion of ownership and control causes more stress in public firms than in privately owned 
which often have concentrated ownership. They indicate that easy access to capital for 
public firms may be more valuable than the possible value lost from the separation of 
ownership and control. (Maksimovic et al. 2013: 2216.) 
 
Moreover, the Nordic public firms are not often faced with the trade-off between sepa-
ration of ownership and access to capital as even public firms operating in the Nordic 
market have relatively high levels of concentrated ownership compared to the US, UK 
and continental European markets. This reasoning makes the exceptional corporate gov-
ernance of Nordic firms a convincing explanation for high performance of public-to-
public acquirers in the Nordic takeover market. (Immonen 2014.) 
 
Our findings show that for the public-to-private deals the higher CARs were found on 
mixed payment deals. The lack of earlier research focusing on mix payment deals may 
tell us more about the difficulties in isolating the effects from one another than for the 
lack of evidence that mix payment deals perform well. We suggest that mixed payment 
deals may include the positive influence from both the cash and stock payments. Hence, 
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